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INTRODUCTION
On a Monday evening in March 2003, as the nation wrestled with the
painful questions whether and on what terms to go to war against Iraq, a
60 year-old man named Stephen Downs walked into a t-shirt shop in the
busy Crossgates shopping mall near Albany, New York. He bought a
custom made shirt with “Peace on Earth” written across the front and
“Give Peace a Chance” across the back. He paid for the shirt, put it on,
and walked to the mall’s food court to eat dinner. Two people noticed the
shirt and complimented Downs, but no one else seemed to pay much
attention. Shortly after he sat down to eat, a security guard approached,
told Downs that he was causing a disturbance, and ordered him to remove
the shirt or leave the mall. Downs politely refused. Mall security then
called local police, who repeated the command that Downs remove the
shirt or leave the mall. When Downs again refused, the police arrested
him for trespass.2
Except for the restrained language of Downs’ shirt, his antiwar
protest replicated Paul Cohen’s famous 1968 stroll through the Los
Angeles County Courthouse with the legend “Fuck the Draft”
emblazoned on his jacket. Both men sought to express opposition to a
divisive, high-stakes military action. Both made their protests by wearing
their messages in prominent hubs of community life. Cohen’s arrest for
disturbing the peace led to perhaps the Supreme Court’s most eloquent
affirmation of the value and sanctity of political protest under the First
Amendment.3 No competent attorney, however, would have cited the
First Amendment in defense of Downs’ nearly identical action. Although
both Cohen and Downs made their protests in public gathering places,
Downs chose a site owned by a private entity. From the standpoint of
constitutional doctrine, the awesome force of the First Amendment
dissipates before any assault from a nongovernmental censor.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and ensuing events have
compelled the federal government to evaluate numerous complex policy
questions. Not in at least the past three decades has the United States had
to make such momentous decisions about whether and to what extent to
use military force in pursuit of the national interest. These policy
quandaries have spurred rich and intense political debate among the
American people. Our discourse, however, has not gone unimpeded. The
government itself has at times discouraged public debate, most
2 See Nicole F. Barr, T-shirt Redux, Charge To Be Dropped: Food Court Frenzy
Protests Arrests, THE ENTERPRISE (Albany County, N.Y.), March 6, 2003, p. 1, 18. When the
Downs arrest generated nationwide publicity, mall officials quietly dropped the charges,
even as the mall became a magnet for antiwar protesters and civil libertarians. See id.;
Melissa Hale Spencer, Supporters’ Eat-in: Downs Tastes Victory, THE ENTERPRISE, March
13, 2003, p. 1. The mall, however, continued to maintain that its private status allowed it
to bar expressive activity. See Molly Belmont, Free Speech! Bill Would Lift Mall Gag, THE
ENTERPRISE, April 3, 2003, p. 1, 21.
3 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

2
notoriously through Attorney General Ashcroft’s declaration that
criticism of the Bush Administrations antiterrorist policies “gives
ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends”4 and
Presidential Press Secretary Ari Fleischer’s citing negative reactions to a
statement critical of the U.S. military as “reminders to all Americans that
they need to watch what they say, watch what they do.”5
Such government pressure against political debate should trouble us,
but it can hardly surprise us. Our expectation that the government will
try to suppress speech is manifest in our deeply ingrained understanding
of the First Amendment’s guarantee of expressive freedom. On that
understanding, the Framers of the Constitution designed the First
Amendment to shield individuals’ decisions whether to speak and what to
say against governmental censorship and punishment. The surprising
feature of impediments to expression during the present national crisis is
that suppression of important political debate has resulted far less often
from official action than from nongovernmental behavior. Stephen
Downs’ arrest in the Crossgates Mall was just one manifestation of a
wave of censorship of political debate that has included not only denials
to protesters of access to property but also suppression of information by
the news media and institutional retaliation against dissenters. During the
Iraq war, for example, the major media refused to show wrenching
images of Iraqi casualties and American prisoners of war.6 National stock
exchanges barred some business reporters from their trading floor as
punishment for their networks’ war reporting.7 These and numerous
similar nongovernmental actions have dramatically impeded public
discourse since the September 11 attacks.
Political debate in times of war and national emergency lies at the
core of First Amendment concern, because such crises make debate both
especially vulnerable and especially valuable. Wartime debate is
especially vulnerable to suppression because of war’s most positive byproduct – its unification of the nation behind a common purpose. With or
without actual government censorship, broad support for government
policy encourages the silencing of wartime dissidents. Wartime debate is
especially valuable because of war’s most awful consequences. Wars kill
people, topple governments, and scar survivors and the ecosystems they
4 Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: The Senate Hearing; Ashcroft Defends
Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S. Foes, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, p. A1. To
leave no doubt about his attitude toward dissenters, the Attorney General added: “To those
who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics
only aid terrorists.” Id.
5 Press
Briefing
by
Ari
Fleischer
(Sept.
26,
2001),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010926-5.html.
Fleischer was commenting on television commentator Bill Maher’s remark that flying an
airplane into a building on a suicide mission took more courage than pushing a button to
fire a missile. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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inhabit. In no other context can government error or malfeasance do
greater harm. A democratic system entrusts the people with ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that government acts wisely. Because wars
and national emergencies require the government to act quickly and
decisively, wartime political discourse must be informed, vigorous, and
unimpeded. The conventional understanding of the First Amendment as
applying only to government action, however, renders the Constitution
powerless to protect wartime debate against nongovernmental
suppression.
We can, and should, understand the First Amendment differently.
This article contends that courts should invoke the First Amendment to
enjoin behavior by nongovernmental institutions that undermines public
debate on matters of national policy. The argument builds on an
approach to the constitutional freedom of expression rooted in the
democracy-centered First Amendment paradigm of Alexander
Meiklejohn,8 an approach I have called the public rights theory of
expressive freedom.9 Part I of this article establishes the special
importance of protecting political debate in times of war and national
emergency. The first section invokes familiar historical examples to
establish the vulnerability of wartime debate to suppression by powerful
nongovernmental entities. It then explains the necessity under the public
rights theory of informed, active public debate for wise governmental
action.
The second section catalogues the many instances of
nongovernmental censorship since the September 11 attacks, using
contemporary circumstances to illustrate nongovernmental institutions’
strong tendency to enforce government policy and majority will during
times of war and national emergency.
Part II assesses the primary legal doctrine that blocks courts from
enjoining private censorship: the public-private distinction in
constitutional law. The first section of Part II maps the arguments and
priorities that support the public-private distinction. The second section
surveys critiques that have branded the distinction incoherent and
ideologically driven. Despite the force of these critiques, the publicprivate distinction persists in our constitutional jurisprudence, indicating
that it must harbor some essential truth. Accordingly, the final section of
Part II seeks to accommodate the public-private distinction to a proper
focus on the substance of constitutional rights. It concludes that the
integrity of natural persons, rather than the abstract idea of “the private,”
should inform adjudication of rights controversies. The public-private
8 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19-21 (1948). For a discussion of
Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory, see infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
9 See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1972-90 (2003) (describing public rights theory).
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distinction, recast along these lines, serves normative theories of rights by
guaranteeing individuals the degree of decisional autonomy they need in
order to effectuate their rights.
Part III applies the foregoing insights about the public-private
distinction to the First Amendment in the context of nongovernmental
suppression of wartime political debate. The first section explains that
the public rights theory of expressive freedom requires a zone of personal
autonomy, insulated from constitutional oversight, to allow individuals to
evaluate information and formulate political positions. That sort of
private preserve, however, provides no constitutional safe harbor for
institutional attacks on wartime debate. The second section contends that
courts should invoke the First Amendment to enjoin many
nongovernmental exclusions of political speakers from expressive
opportunities and reprisals against wartime dissenters. The news media
present special concerns under the public rights theory that justify
insulating journalists’ editorial decisions from judicial oversight, but
courts can apply the First Amendment indirectly to media-generated
constraints on democratic discourse by assertively reviewing regulations
that facilitate concentrated control of media outlets. The final section
responds to practical concerns about empowering federal courts to enjoin
nongovernmental suppression of political debate.
This article advocates a bold departure from received First
Amendment wisdom and fundamentally reconceives the distinction
between public and private that sits at the heart of constitutional doctrine.
My thesis swims against a strong current of opposition to constitutional
limits on private behavior. That opposition, however, presumes that
autonomy for nongovernmental institutions is necessary to protect
freedom. It carries little force where, as in the circumstances I describe,
those institutions compromise freedom.
I. CONFRONTING NONGOVERNMENTAL CENSORSHIP
OF POLITICAL DEBATE IN WARTIME
A. The Value and Vulnerability of Wartime Political
Debate
My thesis, that courts should apply the First Amendment to enjoin
nongovernmental suppression of political debate in times of war and
national emergency, depends on two premises. First, nongovernmental
actions threaten political debate in a meaningful way. Second, during
periods of war and national emergency – for which I will use the
shorthand “wartime” – political debate is especially important for the
common good. The first section of this part defends those premises. It
demonstrates the prevalence of nongovernmental suppression of speech
and invokes a few historical examples to illustrate nongovernmental
institutions’ propensity to suppress wartime political debate. It then
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employs First Amendment theory to establish the cost of muting political
debate and to explain why that cost is especially great in wartime. The
second section brings these observations into the present by cataloguing
nongovernmental actors’ many, varied, and damaging assaults on political
debate since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The article proceeds, in
Part II, to examine and critique the Constitution’s supposed incapacity to
address this problem and, in Part III, to propose a way of overcoming that
incapacity.
1. The Historical Vulnerability of Wartime Political
Debate to Nongovernmental Suppression
Governments have constant motives to suppress speech, because
people routinely use their expressive freedom to criticize the government
or its interests. As a consequence, received cultural and legal wisdom
teach us to beware government interference with speech. Judicial
responses to acts of government censorship fill the United States Reports
and consume treatises on the First Amendment. In contrast, the Supreme
Court rarely acknowledges nongovernmental authorities’ capacity and
enthusiasm for suppressing speech.10 Our intuitive ground for fearing
government censorship, however, reveals the risk of nongovernmental
suppression of speech as well. In a society where formidable private
entities exercise a great deal of influence over people’s lives, individuals
have grounds for questioning and criticizing nongovernmental as well as
governmental conduct. For this reason, powerful nongovernmental
entities frequently take legal action to silence expression that threatens
their interests, notably through strategic lawsuits against public
participation (SLAPP suits),11 intellectual property claims,12 and other
10 The most notable exceptions include Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding, based on capacity of corporations to convert economic wealth
into expressive capital, state statute that limited corporations’ political expenditures); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding FCC regulations that required
broadcasters to provide equal time for opposing political positions constitutional and in the
public interest); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 967 (1964) (invoking First
Amendment to limit liability for alleged defamation of public officials).
11 SLAPP suits are devices by which land developers and other powerful interests use
tort claims to silence opponents of their economic activities. See generally Alice Glover &
Marcus Jimison, SLAPP Suits: A First Amendment Issue and Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J.
122 (1995) (describing phenomenon of SLAPP suits as a threat to expressive freedom and
discussing legislative solutions).
12 Corporations frequently use copyright claims to censor or punish expression,
including important political speech. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (affirming finding of copyright violation against magazine
for publishing account of Nixon pardon from President Ford’s autobiography). For an
account of varied corporate uses of aggressive copyright, see Robert S. Boynton, The
Tyranny of Copryright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, p. 40 (magazine).
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assertions that their common law or statutory rights trump their
opponents’ expressive interests.13
The threat of nongovernmental suppression of political debate
intensifies during times of war and national emergency, when citizens
literally and figuratively tend to “rally ’round the flag.” Powerful voices
call for citizens to set aside differences in deference to the common
national cause.14 In these circumstances, the national government itself
enjoys a freer hand to restrict speech. Paradoxically, however, taking the
risk of constitutional sanction inherent in suppressing speech may make
less sense for the government in wartime than under normal
circumstances, despite courts’ notorious squeamishness about overriding
elected officials’ decisions during times of war and national emergency.15
If the government censors political debate in wartime, it risks inflaming
dissenters and fracturing the sense of national unity.16 Fortuitously for
government, it need not take that risk.
Many nongovernmental
institutions willingly squelch speech critical of government policies in
wartime, whether motivated by sincere animus against dissenters, desire
to curry favor with customers, or interest in the benefits wartime
economic and military initiatives can bring to industry.17 Our nation’s
13 Records of actual litigation understate the force of nongovernmental suppression of
speech, because the mere threat of litigation often silences speakers who lack the means to
fight back in court. In late 2002, for example, a left-wing group called the Yes Men marked
the anniversary of the catastrophic Union Carbide toxic gas leak in Bhopal, India by
circulating a mock press release from Dow Chemical, Union Carbide’s parent corporation.
Dow then threatened litigation against Verio, the upstream Internet access provider that
leased space to the Yes Men’s smaller service provider, Thing.net. Verio reacted by
shutting down the entire Thing network, which housed 255 other Internet addresses
besides the Yes Men, and it subsequently terminated Thing.net’s contract. See C. Carr,
Dow v. Thing: A Free Speech Infringement That’s Worse Than Censorship, VILLAGE VOICE,
Jan. 17, 2003, p. 49.
14 See Cecilia O’Leary and Tony Platt, Pledging Allegiance: The Revival of Prescriptive
Patriotism, in PHIL SCRATON ED., BEYOND SEPTEMBER 11: AN ANTHOLOGY OF DISSENT 173,
173 (2002) (describing, in wake of September 11 attacks, “a new wave of orchestrated
patriotism . . . aimed at closing down debate and dissent through the imposition of a
prescribed allegiance”).
15 Examples of this phenomenon in the Supreme Court include Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (affirming President’s prerogatives in negotiating end to Iranian
hostage crisis); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to military’s internment of Japanese Americans during World War II);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (same); and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
25 (1942) (declining to second-guess military’s determinations regarding combatant status
in World War II); but see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(holding Executive Order seizing steel mills during Korean War beyond President’s powers
and therefore unconstitutional). A recent analogue is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th
Cir. 2003) (urging district court to act cautiously when reviewing military’s decisions made
during military conflict).
16 See Diane L. Zimmerman, “Private” War: The Problem of Access, in SHIMON
SHETREET ED., FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 181, 181 (1991) (suggesting that
government suppression of wartime dissent may undermine public support for war).
17 See David Whyte, Business as Usual? Corporate Moralism and the ‘War Against
Terrorism,’ in SCRATON, supra note 14, at 150, 154-56 (describing potential benefits for
business of post-September 11 U.S. economic policies and war in Afghanistan).
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history provides numerous examples of nongovernmental authorities’ zeal
for clamping down on wartime political debate.
Reprisals for past or perceived political affiliations are a familiar
form of censorship during wartime. The most familiar examples are the
Red Scares that occurred during the uneasy periods following the two
World Wars. Government officials in these two periods played a
prominent role in purging alleged communists from the civil service,
academia, and the arts. The federal government prosecuted political
dissenters during World War I,18 and after the war Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer set a tone of intimidation by authorizing violent raids
against radical groups.19 Beginning in the late 1940s, Senator Joseph
McCarthy20 and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)21
sought to ferret out subversives both in the government and among
nongovernmental professionals.
Much of the ruinous political intimidation in these periods, however,
resulted from voluntary, even enthusiastic nongovernmental behavior.
The infamous Hollywood blacklist evolved from film industry leaders’
decision in 1947 to fire the so-called Hollywood Ten, the initial group of
screenwriters and directors tarred as communists, in order to avert an
amorphous danger of public outcry and boycotts.22 Over the next decade,
movie studios fired numerous directors, writers, and actors because of
real or alleged communist associations. Studio bosses destroyed the
careers even of people whose only crime was to support organizations
that opposed the blacklists23 or to sign briefs and petitions on behalf of
alleged communists.24 Other actual or suspected political radicals lost
their jobs in industries from manufacturing25 to the news media26 to
18 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The American Experience: Free Speech and National
Security, in SHETREET, supra note 16, at 10, 13-15 (describing prosecutions of antiwar
activists during World War I).
19 See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE
41-43 (1990) (describing federal government’s role in 1919-1920 Red Scare).
20 See generally id. at 120-43 (describing Sen. McCarthy’s leadership of anticommunist
frenzy from 1950-1954).
21 See id. at 150-61 (describing HUAC investigations and hearings in early 1950s).
22 See LARRY COPLAIR & STEVEN ENGLUND, THE INQUISITION IN HOLLYWOOD: POLITICS
IN THE FILM COMMUNITY 1930-1960 at 328-31 (1980) (describing November 1947 meeting of
studio heads that decided fate of Hollywood Ten).
23 See id. at 394-95 (discussing studios’ persecution of artists for membership in
organizations that fought blacklist).
24 See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN
AND EISENHOWER 497 (1978) (describing film industry reprisals against actors and others
who signed petitions or amicus briefs that defended accused colleagues or advocated
political and expressive freedoms).
25 See FRIED, supra note 19, at 151 (describing automobile body manufacturer’s
suspension of two workers after their testimony at a HUAC hearing prompted work
stoppage by other employees).
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private academia.27 Even Harvard University, a cornerstone of liberal
American academia, declared in 1953 that academic freedom did not
include the right to be a communist, and as late as 1957 the university’s
president declared that no communist should serve on a university
faculty.28
Professional associations, from the Screen Actors’ and
Directors’ Guilds29 to the American Bar and Medical associations30 to the
American Federation of Teachers,31 vigorously assisted in purging actual
and suspected communists from their respective professions.
The business of ferreting out alleged communists became a model of
free enterprise. In Hollywood, leading figures such as writer-director
Elia Kazan and actor Sterling Hayden fingered friends and associates as
communists in order to advance their own careers.32 Numerous other
Hollywood luminaries helped themselves by offering congressional
investigators extravagant accounts of communist influence in the
movies.33
Professional blacklisters – led by American Business
Consultants, publisher of a compendium of left-wing industry figures
called Red Channels – unearthed and published information about film
artists’ political activities and allegiances and then offered to “clear”
suspects of communist ties – essentially a protection racket.34 Red
Channels became required reading for film and television producers and
advertisers, many of whom cravenly abandoned performers the booklet
listed in order to avoid bad publicity.35 In like manner, painters and
sculptors marginalized by the avant-garde fanned fears of communism in
order to encourage ideological attacks on their modernist colleagues.36

26 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 449-52 (describing firings by newspapers and
America
n Newspaper Guild of employees who had communist ties or had invoked Fifth
Amendment rights in government investigations).
27 See, e.g., id. at 410-11 (describing suspension and forced resignation of M.I.T.
professors who admitted past communist ties); id. at 415-16 (describing politically
motivated dismissals of professors at Columbia and New York Universities).
28 See id. at 411-13 (describing Harvard’s responses to 1950s Red Scare).
29 See FRIED, supra note 19, at 154-55 (describing anticommunist activities of film
guilds).
30 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 403 (describing role of major professional associations
in anticommunist purges).
31 See id. at 405-06 (describing A.F.T.’s refusal to defend teachers who declined to deny
membership in Communist Party).
32 See COPLAIR & ENGLUND, supra note 22, at 377-78 (recounting Kazan’s and
Hayden’s admissions that they had consigned others to blacklist in order to avoid
blacklisting themselves).
33 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 492-93 (describing testimony before Congress of
Hollywood figures including Ronald Reagan, Adolphe Menjou, and Walt Disney).
34 See COPLAIR & ENGLUND, supra note 22, at 386-87 (describing private organizations
that used information to facilitate and profit from blacklist); FRIED, supra note 19, at 156-57
(describing activities of professional blacklisters).
35 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 521-23 (describing interactions among professional
blacklisters, producers, and advertising executives).
36 See FRIED, supra note 19, at 30 (describing anticommunist crusades in visual arts).
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Economic self-interest on the part of both employers and ambitious
union officials38 led to purges of communists in the labor movement
during both Red Scares.39
The possibility or reality of war often has undermined public debate
in another less direct but arguably even more damaging way: by
prompting the news media to forego aggressive, critical newsgathering
and reporting in exchange for sycophantic or cynical acquiescence to
official policy. As in the matter of reprisals against perceived political
opponents, wartime governments have acted to manipulate or intimidate
the press. Much of the blame for the news media’s failures in wartime,
however, falls at the media’s own feet. Media outlets at times have seen
financial gain in inflaming passions for war – most notoriously when
newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst helped ignite the SpanishAmerican War, through selective reporting and outright fabrications,40 in
order to boost his papers’ circulation.41 At other times, as in the period
leading up to the United States’ decision to join the allied cause in World
War I, media corporations have advocated war because they believed the
public favored that course.42 Similarly, ideology often has led the press
to tar political dissenters with unsubstantiated charges of disloyalty, a
powerful tactic in both the first and second Red Scares.43 In addition,
media firms have willingly, sometimes even enthusiastically, embraced
37

See id. at 152 (describing General Electric’s intimidation of left-wing unions during
labor dispute in early 1950s).
38 See id. at 35 (referring to economically motivated anticommunism in labor
movement).
39 Although anticommunist mania had abated by the time of the Vietnam War, some
employers during that period terminated workers for antiwar activities. See, e.g., JAMES W.
CLINTON, THE LOYAL OPPOSITION: AMERICANS IN NORTH VIETNAM, 1965-1972 at 11 (1995)
(presenting oral history of Harold Supriano, who lost several jobs after making factfinding
trip to Hanoi in 1965).
40 See FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY: 1690-1960 at 527 (3d
ed. 1962) (noting that Hearst papers’ biased reporting even “swept blindly over the lastminute capitulation by Spain on all the points at issue”); W.A. SWANBERG, CITIZEN HEARST:
A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST 110 (1961) (stating that Hearst reporters and
other U.S. journalists in Cuba “published accounts of battles that never occurred” and
“narrated a succession of Spanish atrocities entirely unauthenticated”).
41 See MOTT, supra note 40, at 531-32 (discussing economic motivation for Hearst’s
pro-war reporting); SWANBERG, supra note 40, at 108 (same).
42 See MOTT, supra note 40, at 616 (describing U.S. newspapers that advocated entry
into World War I as taking their cues from prevailing public opinion). The press’ role in
encouraging U.S. entry into World War I also reflected British manipulation of American
war correspondents. See PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY: FROM THE CRIMEA TO
VIETNAM: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO, PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER 122 (1975)
(describing effect of British propaganda on U.S. public opinion).
43 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 446-49 (describing newspapers’ trumpeting of
innuendoes about citizens’ alleged communist ties during late 1940s and early 1950s);
FRIED, supra note 19, at 40-41 (describing newspapers’ red baiting of left-wing union
leaders during 1919-1920 Red Scare).
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constraints on their battlefield reporting. 44
Everyone should care about nongovernmental reprisals against
wartime political dissenters and the media’s failures to assess government
policy critically because those actions threaten the national interest.
Informed, open political debate is essential to a well-functioning
democratic system, especially when wars and national emergencies
increase the stakes of policy decisions.45 Understanding the danger that
suppression of speech, whether initiated by the government or not, poses
to our system requires analysis of why expressive freedom stands at the
heart of our constitutional order.
That analysis implicates First
Amendment theory, and particularly a theoretical explanation of the First
Amendment’s speech protection that I have labeled the public rights
theory of expressive freedom.
2. The Public Rights Theory of Expressive Freedom and
the Necessity of Robust Political Debate for Democratic
Government

Self-

The dominant theory of expressive freedom in American law, which I
have called the private rights theory,46 reflects no special concern for
political debate or dissent. That theory explains constitutional expressive
freedom as intended to safeguard individual autonomy by protecting the act
of speaking. Under the private rights theory, the First Amendment affords a
formal, negative shield against government action that limits any speech,
subject to balancing against the government’s competing regulatory interests.
The theory assigns no particular weight to speech aimed at influencing
government policy; rather, it emphasizes the value of self-interested
expression.47 In contrast, an overriding emphasis on the rights of political
dissenters emerges from the private rights theory’s major rival, the public
rights theory.48 The public rights theory treats the First Amendment as
protecting not individuals’ interests in autonomy but the political
44 See KNIGHTLEY, supra note 42, at 123-24 (describing U.S. military efforts to control
war correspondents’ reports during World War I); id. at 274-76, 317-30 (describing military
censorship of correspondents during World War II); id. at 381-82 (describing U.S.
government’s disinformation strategies during Vietnam War). For a description of recent
media acquiescence in military controls beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, see infra notes
104-06 and accompanying text.
45 See JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE
POWER vii (1999) (positing harm to democratic decisionmaking from government’s tendency
to suppress political debate during wartime); Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and
Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 444
(2002) (contending that aggressive government investigations that discredit political
dissenters “undermine the effectiveness of popular self-government”).
46 For a thorough explanation of the private rights theory, see Magarian, supra note 9,
at 1947-59.
47 See id. at 1953-54 (describing pluralist and individuated character of expressive
freedom under private rights theory).
48 For a thorough explanation of the public rights theory, see id. at 1972-91.
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community’s interest in informed, broadly participatory policymaking. It
views the Amendment as a substantive guarantor of a positive value: open,
robust democratic discourse. Expressive freedom, under the public rights
theory, means more than shielding formal opportunities for expression
against government interference; it means ensuring that vigorous debate
about policy matters actually takes place.49
The public rights theory has its roots in the seminal writings of
Alexander Meiklejohn. Based on his view that the absolutist language of the
First Amendment required some substantive limitation in the Amendment’s
scope,50 Meiklejohn contends that we should understand the First
Amendment as protecting only speech necessary to the democratic process,
thereby ensuring “that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing
because it is on one side of the issue rather than another.”51 Meiklejohn
defends this choice on the ground that self-government is the essential object
of the Constitution.52 While the limitation to political speech leaves
Meiklejohn open to cogent criticism for consigning much important speech
to the dubious mercies of the political majority,53 it allows him and his
inheritors to advocate comprehensive protection for speech with a substantial
claim to centrality in the constitutional scheme. Meiklejohn’s First
Amendment theory emphasizes the interest not of the speaker, but of the
listener. His concern is “not that everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying be said.”54 This emphasis reflects the underlying purpose that
Meiklejohn identifies with the First Amendment: wise, informed deliberation
in the service of democratic self-government. “[C]onflicting views may be
expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but because they
are relevant.”55
Political dissent stands at the core of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment. He
sharply criticizes Justice Holmes’ initial conception of the “clear and present
danger” test, which allowed criminalization of subversive advocacy in
wartime.56 “Taken literally,” warns Meiklejohn of Holmes’ formulation, “it
49 See id. at 1983-85 (discussing substantive nature of expressive freedom under public
rights theory).
50 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 19-21 (positing paradox of First Amendment’s
scope).
51 Id. at 26-27.
52 See id. at 27 (“The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of
the program of self-government.”).
53 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 59697 (1982) (criticizing narrow focus of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory). For a
discussion of Meiklejohn’s eventual expansion of his concept of political speech, see infra
notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
54 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 26.
55 Id. at 28.
56 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The original “clear and
present danger” test still cast a long shadow at the time Meiklejohn wrote. As recently as
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means that in all ‘dangerous’ situations, minorities, however law-abiding and
loyal, must be silent.”57 Meiklejohn forthrightly accepts the danger that
unfettered political speech might destroy the very system that protects it,
invoking with admiration Holmes’ later dissent in Gitlow v. New York:58 “If,
in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way.”59 For Meiklejohn, that sentiment embodies “Americanism.”60 He
celebrates dissent because he insists unpopular viewpoints, by virtue of their
variance with accepted wisdom, make a singularly valuable contribution to
informed political decisionmaking in a democratic society.61 Meiklejohn’s
position emulates the Supreme Court’s greatest statement on the necessity of
dissent, Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney v. California:62 “Men
feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears.”63
Meiklejohn’s approach to the First Amendment has received vital
elaboration from subsequent theorists. Most notably, Owen Fiss64 and Cass
Sunstein65 have urged approaches to the First Amendment that focus on
substantive political debate as the democratic bottom line of expressive
freedom. Fiss argues forcefully for the value of activist government in
sustaining the conditions needed for democratic discourse.66 Sunstein
mounts a two-layered, civic republican argument for a First Amendment
theory that would either focus on the results of expressive freedom
controversies for democratic deliberation67 or simply give primacy to
political speech.68 Their rhetoric, however, nowhere matches the force of
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court took a highly permissive position on
punishment of subversive advocacy. Not until Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
would the Court fully abandon the “clear and present danger” formulation in favor of the
much more speech-protective incitement test.
57 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 44.
58 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
59 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoted in MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 42).
60 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 43.
61 Id. at 28 (“When a question of policy is ‘before the house,’ free men choose to meet it
not with their eyes shut, but with their eyes open. To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be
unfit for self-government.”).
62 274 U.S. 357.
63 Id. at 376; see also id. at 375 (ascribing to founding generation the belief “that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people”).
64 See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss,
Why the State?); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405
(1986) (hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure).
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992) (hereinafter
Sunstein, Free Speech).
66 See, e.g., Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 64, at 781-83 (offering New Deal
regulation of economic activity as basis for allowing some government regulation of
expressive activity).
67 See Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 263-300.
68 See id. at 301-15.
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Meiklejohn’s special concern with suppression of political dissent. Rather,
in advocating a shift in First Amendment priorities, both Fiss and Sunstein
focus more on what they see the First Amendment as improperly protecting –
corporate license, special access for the wealthy to means of expression,
pornography – than on what they see it as failing sufficiently to protect.69
They worry more about misallocations of expressive opportunities than about
outright suppression of dissenting positions.70 Given that Fiss and Sunstein
made their contributions to the public rights theory in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, a period marked by relative peace and prosperity, their focus on
distributive injustices rather than blatant censorship makes perfect sense.
In contrast, Meiklejohn wrote his essays on the First Amendment forty
years earlier, at the height of the second Red Scare’s asphyxiation of political
debate. Meiklejohn, in fact, actively resisted the anticommunist purge,
coauthoring a Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of the Hollywood Ten
in 194971 and assailing the ACLU’s condemnation of the Communist Party
in 1953.72 He witnessed firsthand the federal judiciary’s failure to protect
political debate from the tide of anticommunist political correctness.73 In
perhaps the most passionate words he ever wrote, Meiklejohn situated his
First Amendment theory
[i]n these wretched days of postwar and, it may be, of
prewar, hysterical brutality, when we Americans, from the
president down, are seeking to thrust back Communist belief
by jailing its advocates, by debarring them from office, by
expelling them from the country, by hating them . . .74
Similarly overt threats to dissenters in the wartime, postwar, and prewar
years of the early 20th Century formed the context for Justices Holmes’ and
Brandeis’ initial development of the Supreme Court’s modern First

69

See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 64, at 788 (positing that “the market brings to
bear on editorial and programming decisions factors that might have a great deal to do with
profitability or allocative efficiency . . . but little to do with the democratic needs of the
electorate); Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 258 (criticizing shift in attention of
First Amendment discourse from less powerful to extremely powerful claimants).
70 Indeed, Fiss contrasts his theoretical concerns with what he characterizes as First
Amendment theory’s foundational focus on the street corner speaker. See Fiss, Social
Structure, supra note 64, at 1408-11. That Fiss associates the image of the street corner
speaker with an ideal of autonomy rather than of dissent, going so far as to portray
Meiklejohn as having emphasized autonomy, see id. at 1410-11, tells a great deal about the
differences between the divergent historical contexts of Meiklejohn and Fiss.
71 See ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN 1872-1964, at 275-76 (2001) (summarizing Meiklejohn’s brief).
72 See id. at 283-84.
73 See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. L. L. REV. 393, 397 & n.30
(1988) (describing Supreme Court’s rejection in 1950s of First Amendment challenges to
elements of anticommunist purges) (hereinafter Horwitz, Rights).
74 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 43.
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Amendment jurisprudence.75 The first decade of our new century, with its
climate of polarized mass sentiment against a deeply frightening
international threat, bears striking similarities to the ages that inspired these
thinkers to emphasize the necessity of protecting dissent. As in those ages,
pundits today argue that the presence of an international threat transforms
political dissent into a species of treason.76 Meiklejohn’s analysis of the First
Amendment, however, provides a compelling account of why our nation
needs dissent most deeply when the dangers we face are gravest.
History bears out Meiklejohn’s emphasis on the value of dissent and
open political discourse. The anticommunist purges described above,
today a source of national embarrassment, sustained themselves largely
by their attacks on dissenting voices.77 The antiwar and civil rights
movements of the 1960s provide the most prominent instances in recent
American history of the ability of popular, grassroots dissenters to spur
crucial policy changes.78 Over the past decade, emerging democracies’
emphasis on creating avenues for dissent and debate has underscored the
necessity of vigorous political discourse for a healthy democratic
system.79
Why have open debate and dissent proved so indispensable?
75 The seminal First Amendment opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis came in
cases that involved either antiwar protest, communist advocacy, or both. See Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (suggesting that prosecution
under state statute based only on membership in Socialist Party would violate First
Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(contending that publication of communist materials that present no clear and present
danger of overthrowing government was protected speech); United States ex rel. Milwaukee
Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that allowing Postmaster broad powers to exclude from mails publications alleged
to intend interference with military operations would violate First Amendment); id. at 436
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (same); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that state statute that banned publishing statements that urged
resisting military recruitment violated First Amendment); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (affirming conviction based on speech intended to obstruct
recruitment); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (affirming conviction
for public advocacy of resistance to war with intent and effect of preventing recruiting);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (affirming, under “clear and
present danger” test, conviction based on distribution of leaflets that urged resistance to
draft); see also Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.) (affirming
plaintiff’s First Amendment right to publish anti-war statements in absence of direct
advocacy of violating law).
76 As the invasion of Iraq commenced, Fox News commentator Bill O’Reilly stated: “It
is our duty as loyal Americans to shut up once the fighting begins . . . .” Steve Chapman,
The Protesting Patriots, BALT. SUN, April 1, 2003, p. A11 (quoting O’Reilly). Conservative
activist David Horowitz expressed a similar view: “In war, some sort of basic unity against
the enemy is necessary. To seek to disrupt that unity is to aid the enemy.” Dick Polman, A
Clash Over Who Is a Patriot, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 23, 2003, p. C1 (quoting Horowitz).
77 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
78 See generally CHARLES DEBENEDETTI, AN AMERICAN ORDEAL: THE ANTIWAR
MOVEMENT OF THE VIETNAM ERA (1990); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
EQUALITY 1954-1980 (1981).
79 See, e.g., STJEPAN MALOVIC AND GARY W. SELNOW, THE PEOPLE, PRESS, AND
POLITICS OF CROATIA (2001).
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Deliberative polling, a system that gauges the effect of debate on
decisionmaking, suggests that discourse about contentious issues enables
people to formulate more independent, better grounded policy positions.80
A deliberative poll conducted at the University of Pennsylvania in early
2003 illustrates the device in the present national crisis. Participants in
the Pennsylvania exercise filled out a survey about their views on various
foreign policy questions, then spent a weekend in discussions with
foreign policy experts and ordinary citizens. At the end of the weekend,
the participants revisited the survey questions. According to their revised
responses, more viewed Iraq as a threat, favored increased foreign aid,
and advocated cooperation with the United Nations. In addition, more
participants could accurately answer factual questions about foreign
policy.81 Debate and discussion of a wide range of views led these
citizens to more broadly informed, more nuanced positions on a range of
important issues.
The Pennsylvania exercise confirms longstanding insights about the
value of open debate for wise collective decisionmaking. In an analysis
of recent social and political science literature on dissent, Professor
Sunstein recounts a series of experiments by social psychologist Solomon
Asch in which test subjects, presented with simple problems, conformed
their responses to group pressures even to the extent of validating
obviously incorrect responses.82 When Asch varied the experiment by
placing one “voice of reason” within the conformist group, the test
subjects proved more willing to deviate from group opinion and solve the
problems correctly.83 The beneficial effects of dissent extend even to
success in war. Sunstein recounts the observations of a Roosevelt
administration official who had studied the effects of political systems on
the warmaking capacities of the nations that fought World War II. The
official concluded that, in spite of the apparent efficiencies of totalitarian
political organization, democracy and expressive freedom gave the
United States and its democratic allies an important competitive
advantage – because public debate encouraged wise policy choices.84
Unfortunately, as discussed above,85 wars and similar periods of
national anxiety tend to discourage the very political debate and dissent
they render so essential. Prior to the September 11 attacks, lessons about
80 For a description and discussion of deliberative polling, see JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995).
81 See Michael C. Schaffer, Foreign-Policy Session Alters Group’s Views, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 14, 2003, p. A8. For details on the project’s methodology and results, see
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/btp/nic_main.html (visited Oct. 10, 2003).
82 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 20-21 (2003).
83 See id. at 26-27.
84 See id. at 146-49.
85 See supra section I.A.1.
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the danger of private suppression of wartime political debate seemed like
remote footnotes to history. The events of the past two years, however,
have led to an incidence of nongovernmental censorship not seen since at
least the Vietnam era, at great cost to the national interest. The next
section describes the most prominent instances of nongovernmental
impediments to public political debate during the present campaign
against international terrorism. This narrative lays a foundation for the
second and third parts of this article, which explain why our present
understanding of the First Amendment fails to address nongovernmental
suppression of political debate and advocates a changed understanding of
constitutional law that would allow courts to rectify that failing.

B. Nongovernmental Censorship of Political Speech During
the “War on Terrorism”
Two key events have bracketed the current U.S. initiative against
international terrorism: the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the
American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq beginning in March 2003.
The period defined by these two events, especially the months following
the attacks and the months leading up to the Iraq war, has produced
profound and pronounced divisions in public opinion in the United States.
The federal and state governments have taken relatively few actions
against dissenters that would trigger opportunities for judicial relief under
the First Amendment. Congress in the U.S.A. Patriot Act forbade
advising “known terrorist groups,”86 a provision a District Court struck
down on First Amendment vagueness grounds.87 Opponents also have
challenged a provision of the Act that authorizes scrutiny of, among other
things, library patrons’ borrowing records, thereby discouraging access to
information that might arouse suspicion.88 Government institutions, such
as colleges, have made some efforts to discourage debate.89 Military
86 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (U.S.A Patriot Act), H.R. 3162, 107th Cong.,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
87 See Eric Lichtblau, Citing Free Speech, Judge Voids Part of Antiterror Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, p. A16.
88 See U.S.A Patriot Act, 115 Stat. 272 (amending Title V of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1861) to require production of “any tangible things”
including books, records, papers and other documents in investigations regarding
international terrorism); Associated Press, Patriot Act Draws Lawsuit, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 31, 2003, p. A3.
89 See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Professors Protest as Students Debate, N.Y. TIMES, April 5,
2003, p. A1 (reporting that “Irvine Valley College in Southern California sent faculty
members a memo that warned them not to discuss the war unless it was specifically related
to course material”).
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officials have tried, apparently with little success, to suppress expressions
of concern among service members and their families about the
reconstruction of Iraq.90 Perhaps most disturbing, numerous antiwar
groups and other peaceful dissenters have suffered law enforcement
infiltration and investigation, in a strategy reminiscent of Vietnam-era
domestic spying.91 For the most part, however, government officials
have avoided actions that might prompt First Amendment challenges.
In contrast, nongovernmental authorities have frequently and overtly
impeded debate. In some cases, censorship may result from concrete
relationships between nongovernmental institutions and the government.
Such relationships theoretically may support legally cognizable claims of
state action, although the Court’s willingness to credit such claims is
doubtful.92 But voluntary nongovernmental suppression of speech based
on real or perceived self-interest is, on the conventional understanding,
wholly private and therefore beyond the First Amendment’s reach. The
following discussion catalogues the most prominent instances of
nongovernmental censorship during the present antiterrorism campaign.
These instances fall into three principal categories: media corporations’
misinformation and suppression of information; bans against dissenting
speech on private property frequented by the public; and reprisals against
people who have previously engaged in dissent.
1. Misinformation and Suppression of Information by
News Media
One feature of the public rights theory that has enjoyed substantial
currency in the legal mainstream is the idea that the press – print and
electronic – has a special capacity, and thus a special responsibility, to
inform the public about arguable failings by the government and to
provide information necessary for political debate.93 Never is this
90 See Jerry Adler, Families Ask Why, Newsweek, Aug. 4, 2003, p. 30 (discussing email
from U.S. Army commander that discouraged military family members from raising
concerns with government or media).
91 See Michelle Goldberg, A Thousand J. Edgar Hoovers, Salon.com, Feb. 12, 2004
(http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/12/dissent_two/index.html)
(visited Feb. 12, 2004) (documenting infiltration and aggressive investigations of groups and
individuals opposed to Iraq war by federal and local law enforcement agencies); Michelle
Goldberg,
Outlawing
Dissent,
Salon.com,
Feb.
11,
2004
(http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/index.html)
(visited Feb. 11, 2004) (same); Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, PROGRESSIVE,
Jan. 2002, p. 9 (describing federal investigations of people and institutions who had
expressed opposition to U.S. foreign policy or antiterrorism tactics).
92 See infra section II.A.1. (discussing state action doctrine).
93 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 554-65 (discussing relationship between Meiklejohn’s First
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function more important than in wartime.94 Since the September 11
attacks the American media often have performed this task assertively.
Far too frequently, however, news organizations have gone out of their
way to avoid presenting information that might fuel criticism of
government policy. Increasingly controlled by large entertainment
corporations that strive to avoid alienating consumers and advertisers,
national media outlets have suppressed information of potentially great
importance for assessing government policy. At times media outlets have
gone farther, slanting their newsgathering and reporting to support
dubious government assertions. The government has encouraged some of
these failings, but they all ultimately depend on media corporations’
voluntary withdrawal from vigorous newsgathering and reporting.
The 2001 terrorist attacks made Osama bin Laden a figure of intense
interest and importance for the American public. The al Quaeda leader
fueled Americans’ fear and rage by issuing several videotaped messages
that, among other things, urged Muslims to take up arms against the
United States. Initially, the broadcast media prominently featured bin
Laden’s videos in prime time news reports. On October 10, 2001,
however, the major U.S. television networks, prodded by a request from
National Security Adviser Condolezza Rice, promised the government
they would not broadcast messages from bin Laden and his followers
without at least reviewing them first.95 The Bush Administration argued
primarily that bin Laden’s messages might contain operational signals to
terrorists, although this suggestion rested on mere speculation and
ignored the easy availability of bin Laden’s recordings through other
media.96 More troubling was Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer’s dismissal
of the tapes’ informational value as “[a]t best . . . propaganda, calling on
people to kill Americans.”97 The networks willingly denied the public
this intensely salient information. A CNN statement summed up the
networks’ posture: “In deciding what to air, CNN will consider guidance

Amendment theory and idea that First Amendment centrally protects media check on
government); Neil W. Netanel, The Commercial Mass Media’s Continuing Fourth Estate
Role, in NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & NEIL W. NETANEL EDS., THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 317, 320-23 (2002) (describing necessary functions of mass media in
sustaining liberal democracy) (hereinafter Netanel, Mass Media); Potter Stewart, “Or of the
Press,” 26 HAST. L.J. 631 (1975) (advancing thesis that Press Clause of First Amendment
charged press with special responsibility to check government abuses).
94 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, OUR MEDIA NOT THEIRS: THE
DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE AGAINST CORPORATE MEDIA 64-65 (2002) (“When a democracy
considers whether to engage in war, the free flow of information is of dramatic significance:
How can parents decide that the favor sending their sons and daughters off to fight when
they lack adequate information about the causes, goals, and strategies of the proposed
fight?”).
95 See Sumana Chatterjee, Networks Pledge Restraint on bin Laden Tapes, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Oct. 11, 2001, p. A10.
96 See id.
97 Id.
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from appropriate authorities.”
Major news organizations displayed similar fealty to authority in
their credulous treatment of government positions before and during the
Iraq war. First, the press appears to have perpetuated its historic pattern
of fostering public support for war.99 During late 2002 and early 2003,
the Bush administration argued relentlessly that Iraq posed an immediate
threat to the United States that warranted a preemptive invasion.
Opinion polls from this period reveal a remarkable set of public
misperceptions about Iraq’s military capacity and alleged relationship to
the September 11 attacks, beyond even the administration’s boldest
assertions. In a major national poll taken in January 2003, 44 percent of
respondents expressed the view that all or most of the September 11
hijackers were Iraqi citizens, and 41 percent believed Iraq possessed
nuclear weapons.100 The next month, almost two thirds of respondents to
another nationwide poll believed United Nations weapons inspectors had
found proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction.101 In that
survey 57 percent of respondents also believed Saddam Hussein had
aided the September 11 hijackers, and in March two major polls found
that about half the public believed Hussein was personally involved in the
September 11 attacks.102 No serious evidence has ever arisen to support
the Hussein-September 11 link, and the other beliefs recited above were
and are demonstrably false. This disconnect between public perception
and reality at best reflects a profound failure by the media to inform the
American people about issues of deep national import and at worst
evinces reporting slanted in favor of going to war.
Second, the news media’s coverage of the Iraq war often sacrificed
independence and critical analysis for access to official decisionmakers
and feel-good patriotism. Frank reporting about the conduct of a war can
inspire and substantiate antiwar dissent, as occurred dramatically when
war correspondents in the late 1960s exposed the American public to the
carnage in Vietnam.103 Despite the importance of unfettered reporting
98

Id.
See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
100 See
Ari Berman, Polls Suggest Media Failure in Pre-War Coverage,
EDITORPUBLISHER.COM, March 26, 2003 (citing January 2003 Knight-Ridder/Princeton
Research poll).
101 See id. (citing February 2003 Pew Research Center/Council on Foreign Relations
survey).
102 See id.
103 See KNIGHTLEY, supra note 42, at 382-83 (contending that battlefield reporting from
Vietnam “toppled a president, split the country, and caused many Americans to make a
serious reappraisal of the basic nature of their nation”); Michael D. Steger, Slicing the
Gordian Knot: A Proposal to Reform Military Regulation of Media Coverage of Combat
Operations, 28 U.S.F.L. REV. 957, 966 (1994) (describing impact of nightly televised
broadcasts of Vietnam war on public opinion). A similar backlash occurred when news
99
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from the battlefield, national media organizations during the 1991 Gulf
War agreed to substantial constraints on reporting, including limits on the
number of reporters granted access to the battlefield and even military
screening of dispatches.104 When independent media challenged those
constraints in court, the mainstream media stood silent, trading
independence for access and competitive advantage within the
government’s prescribed limits.105 Once the Iraq war began in March
2003, the U.S. media gained international notoriety for its refusal to
depict injured or dead Iraqi civilians, frightened American prisoners of
war, and other images of the war’s human costs.106 CNN’s top war
correspondent, Christiane Amanpour, decried her own network’s war
coverage as “muzzled” due to “intimidat[ion] by the administration and
by its foot soldiers at Fox News.”107
Several major media corporations, notably the New York Times and
CNN, reported credulously about supposed discoveries of Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction that turned out to be false alarms.108 Some of the
Times reports relied on questionable sources and received clearance from

footage of soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu shifted public support against
continued U.S. involvement in the Somali civil war. See Capt. William A. Wilcox, Jr., Media
Coverage of Military Operations: OPLAW Meets the First Amendment, 1995 ARMY LAW. 42,
49 (1995) (arguing that extensive media coverage may have precipitated early withdrawal
of troops from Mogadishu).
104 See William E. Lee, “Security Review” and the First Amendment, 25 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 743, 746-47 (2002) (describing restrictions agreed to by media organizations
covering Gulf War); Steger, supra note 103, at 972-73 (same). Military screening of stories,
beyond its directly restrictive effects, also chilled and impeded aggressive reporting. See
Lee, supra, at 761-62 (describing effects of military security review on journalists during
Gulf War).
105 See Lee, supra note 104, at 752-53 (analyzing large U.S. media outlets’ refusal to
sue government over wartime constraints on newsgathering and reporting). Legal
challenges to government constraints on wartime reporting have a basis in First
Amendment decisions granting the media rights of access to certain public proceedings. See
Zimmerman, supra note 16, at 184-89 (explaining basis in precedent for claims of First
Amendment rights of access to battlefields).
106 See, e.g., Cynthia Cotts, News of the Dirty War, VILLAGE VOICE, April 9, 2003, p. 34
(cataloguing U.S. media’s failure to report widely on U.S.-led coalition’s bombings of Iraqi
civilians, use of cluster bombs, and actions against foreign reporters). Brit Hume of the
unapologetically pro-war Fox News provided a telling apologia for this tendency: “You don’t
have to be a genius to know that war is bloody and people die and injuries happen and these
things are ugly. It does not need to be splayed out in graphic detail.” Did We See the Real
War? Or Just What the Pentagon Wanted Us to See?, ROLLING STONE, June 12, 2003, at 43,
45.
107 Peter Johnson, Amanpour: CNN Practiced Self-Censorship, USATODAY.COM, Sep.
14,
2003,
http://www.usatoday.com/life/columnist/mediamix/2003-09-14-

media-mix_x.htm (visited Sep. 16, 2003) (quoting Christiane Amanpour). Responding to
Amanpour’s comments, Fox News spokeswoman Irena Briganti declared: “Given the choice,
it’s better to be viewed as a foot soldier for Bush than a spokeswoman for al-Quaeda.” Id.
108 See Cynthia Cotts, What, No Smoking Gun?, VILLAGE VOICE, April 29, 2003, p. 33.
President Bush eventually had to withdraw his claim that Iraq had possessed illicit
weapons. See David E. Sanger, Bush Backs Away From His Claims About Iraq Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, p. A1.
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military officials.
Amanpour admitted that CNN’s reporting on Iraqi
weapons reflected “disinformation at the highest levels.”110 In addition,
American reporters uncritically accepted the Pentagon’s account of the
rescue of a prisoner of war, Army private Jessica Lynch, which became
one of the most prominent media events in the war. Later reports by the
BBC suggested the Army had exaggerated the episode deliberately to
fabricate a heroic myth.111
The present antiterrorism campaign has generated numerous other
instances of compromised news reporting. In one notorious episode
during the Iraq war, President Bush let slip in a press conference
exchange with CNN correspondent Jon King that the White House had
prescreened scripted questions.112 This embarrassing episode, which
produced “a ripple of nervous laughter” among the assembled reporters,
was conspicuous by its absence from the national media’s accounts of the
press conference.113 After the September 11 attacks, the CNN Airport
Network delayed or censored reports about aviation safety “that might
cause anxiety or concern.”114 The network assiduously shielded air
travelers from information many of them likely considered of the utmost
relevance, going so far as to cut off in mid-broadcast one report about a
deranged passenger’s antics aboard a Chicago-bound jetliner.115 Around
the same time, conservative commentator John Podhoretz fumed that the
media ignored a graphic Associated Press report in which he described a
virulent anti-American celebration at a Palestinian university, which
included desecration of an American flag.116 Months after the attacks, a
New York Daily News reporter revealed that his editors, apparently at
government urging, had refused to publish information he uncovered
about the extent of the health risks posed by the twin towers’
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destruction.117 The Sinclair Broadcast Group, the nation’s largest
owner of television stations, refused to air on its eight ABC affiliates
a broadcast of ABC’s Nightline program dedicated to reading the
names of Americans killed in the Iraq war, because Sinclair asserted
that the program sought to convey an antiwar message.118 While
some news outlets were acceding to government constraints and
suppressing uncomfortable facts, others compromised their objective
distance from government policy with conspicuous displays of patriotic
fervor.119
News media misinformation and self-censorship has left the people of
the United States with lesser grounds for assessing the merits of critical
policy decisions about war and terrorism than a truly independent press
would provide. Although the government played a leading role in
constraining reporting about the bin Laden tapes and about some aspects
of the Iraq war, media corporations bear ultimate responsibility for the
constraints. Had news organizations held out for greater freedom to
report information openly, they would have either prevailed or forced the
government to fight legal battles to mandate limits on reporting. Instead,
by betraying their duty to gather and report information impartially and
vigorously, the news organizations let the government have its cake and
eat it too: the government got the silence it wanted without having to risk
constitutional liability.
2. Exclusions of Political Speakers from Privately Owned
Public Spaces.
Private property is often essential for political debate because so
much public interaction takes place in privately owned space, from
shopping malls to the Internet. No one advocates wholesale appropriation
of private property for the sake of public discourse, but expressive
activity is a natural and appropriate by-product of the general uses to
which certain property owners – such as shopping mall owners, media
corporations that depend on advertising revenues, and Internet service
providers – choose for self-interested reasons to dedicate their property.
During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous property
owners of this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics
of government policies from channels of expression opened by their own
117 See JUAN GONZALEZ, FALLOUT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
WORLD
TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE 16-20 (2002)
118 See Lisa de Moraes, Stations to Boycott “Nightline’s” List of the Fallen,
Wash. Post, April 30, 2004, p. C7.
119 See Ed Bark, Media’s Allegiance Debated, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2001,
p. 25A (asking, shortly after terrorist attacks: “[W]hen 24-hour cable news networks
incorporate the Stars and Stripes into on-air logos, are they in any way compromising their
journalistic integrity?”); James Poniewozik, Whose Flag Is Bigger?, TIME, April 14, 2003, p.
71 (criticizing, during Iraq war, “[media] decision makers who should be providing context
and balance rather then festooning their screens with bunting”).
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invitations for the public to use their property.
The most emblematic incidents involved expulsion of lone, peaceful
protesters from spaces frequented by the public. Stephen Downs’ arrest
at the Crossgates Mall120 followed an incident a few months earlier in
which the same mall had called the police to expel several local peace
activists who had taped antiwar messages to their clothing and entered the
mall.121 Around the same time, a New York City K-Mart store had
shopper Amy Hamilton-Thibert arrested for trespassing. HamiltonThibert expressed herself somewhat more flamboyantly than Downs had:
she wore an Easter bunny costume and handed out plastic eggs to protest
K-Mart’s sale of military themed Easter baskets.122 Similar, fartherreaching incidents involved intangible private space. In the broadcast
arena, television networks and channels including CNN and CBS refused
to sell advertising time to various advocacy groups who sought to air their
views on Middle East controversies, including the invasion of Iraq, and
wartime economic policies.123 The broadcasters claimed that refusing
“controversial” advertisements protected “the integrity of . . . news
department[s], the public discourse and local sensibilities around the
country,”124 but they offered no explanation of how stifling political
debate was supposed to advance public discourse.
In cyberspace, several Internet service providers (ISPs) suspended or
dropped content providers for posting controversial information about
terrorism or Iraq. After the September 11 attacks, ISP Hypervine shut
down an entire content network, Cosmic Entertainment, until Cosmic
removed IRA Radio, Al Lewis Live, and Our Americas, programs that
had all broadcast interviews with alleged terrorists.125 In addition, portal
sites such as America Online and Yahoo reportedly “severely censored or
pulled the plug entirely on certain message boards that had attracted anti-
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American and anti-Islam postings.”126
During the Iraq War,
Massachusetts-based ISP Akamai Technologies cancelled its contract to
host Arabic-language news service Al-Jazeera.127 Florida-based ISP
Vortech temporarily removed a left-wing news site, YellowTimes.org,
because the site had posted images of U.S. prisoners captured in the Iraq
war.128 Vortech reportedly condemned the pictures as “disrespectful,
tacky, and disgusting”129 and claimed that their display violated a termsof-service agreement signed by YellowTimes, although YellowTimes
reported that Vortech had altered the terms-of-service agreement to fit the
incident.130
Numerous entertainment corporations and institutions refused to
display or publish art that questioned government policies in the wake of
September 11. Censorship of popular music was especially widespread.
Just after the terrorist attacks, officials of the Clear Channel radio empire
circulated a “suggested” list of 150 songs to be barred from airplay.131
The list was both comically random – including, for example, the
Bangles’ “Walk Like an Egyptian” and the Beatles’ “Ob-La-Di, Ob-LaDa” – and ominously ideological: the lone musical group singled out for a
total ban were Rage Against the Machine, the most aggressively left-wing
rock band in recent memory.132 Major music retailers refused to carry an
album by rapper Paris entitled Sonic Jihad, whose cover depicted a jet
about to slam into the White House.133 Country singer Toby Keith even
faced censorship for expression deemed overly patriotic when ABC
dropped his performance of the revenge anthem “Courtesy of the Red,
White and Blue” from its 2002 July 4th telecast.134
Elsewhere in the entertainment world, Hollywood studios delayed or
cancelled numerous films scheduled for late 2001 releases – with one,
126 Terrorism Rears Its Anti-U.S. Message on Net, MILW. JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Sep. 25,
2001, p. M2 (reprinted from HOLLYWOOD REPORTER).
127 See Sandeep Junnarkar, Akamai ends Al-Jazeera server support, CNET News.com,
April 4, 2003 (http://news.com.com/1200-1035-995546.html) (visited April 7,
2003).
128 See Bernhard Warner, Censorship debate as POW pictures pulled (Reuters), March
25, 2003 (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/030325/80/dw9a3.html) (visited June 6,
2003).
129 Id. (quoting Vortech email to YellowTimes editor Erich Marquardt).
130 See Firas al-Atraqchi, War pictures cause Yellowtimes.org to be shut down, again,
YellowTimes.org,
March
24,
2003
(http://www.unknownnews.net/yellowtimes032403.html) (visited June 6, 2003).
131 See Clea Simon, Attacks Prompt List of “Banned” Songs, BOS. GLOBE, Sep. 20, 2001,
p. D3.
132 See id. (reprinting Clear Channel list).
133 See Neil Strauss, Furor Over Rapper’s Cover Art Statement, N.Y. TIMES, April 3,
2003, p. E3.
134 See Singer Says ABC’s Jennings Gave Him the Boot, CNN.com, June 13, 2002
(http://www.cnn.com/2002/SHWBIZ/Music/06/13/toby keith.abc/index.html)
(visited Aug. 5, 2002).
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Phillip Noyce’s adaptation of Graham Greene’s novel The Quiet
American, shelved by Mirimax for more than a year because it criticized
expansionist U.S. foreign policy.135 The Baltimore Museum of Art
removed a painting that prominently featured the word “terrorist” after
patrons reportedly called the work “disturbing.”136
The Boston
Symphony Orchestra cancelled a previously scheduled performance of
excerpts from John Adams’ opera The Death of Klinghoffer, citing similar
“sensitivity” concerns.137 HarperCollins nearly cancelled publication of
Michael Moore’s Stupid White Men, which went on to become a
bestseller, because the book criticized President Bush; the publisher
relented only after an email campaign by librarians.138 Moore faced
corporate censure again in 2004, when Walt Disney’s Miramax
division refused to distribute his documentary film Farenheit 911,
which criticized President Bush’s actions around the 2001 attacks.139
Cartoonists Aaron McGruder and Ted Rall saw newspapers drop their
strips for criticizing, respectively, President Bush and families of the
terror attacks’ victims.140 All of these artistic creations and performances,
in their varied ways, encouraged listeners and viewers to confront
perspectives or acknowledge emotions that many would have found
offensive or unpleasant.141 Their censorship served to stifle the insights
such confrontations often bring.
3. Reprisals Against Political Expression.
135 See Anne Thompson, Films With War Themes Are Victims of Bad Timing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, p. E1. Another Mirimax film, Gregor Johnson’s Buffalo Soldiers,
screened at the Toronto Film Festival in September 2001 but had its U.S. theatrical release
canceled because of its negative portrayal of U.S. soldiers. See id.
136 Michael Scarcella, BMA Pulls Art Bearing Word “Terrorist,” BALT. SUN, Sep. 17,
2001, p. 3B.
137 See Mark Swed, “Klinghoffer”: Too Hot to Handle?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, sec. 6
at 1.
138 See Eric Demby, Angry White Men, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 21-27, 2002 (http://www.
Villagevoice.com/issues/0234/demby.php)
(visited June 6, 2003)
139 See Jim Rutenberg & Laura M. Holson, Disney Takes Heat on Blocking
Bush Film, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, p. ___.
140 See Stephen Lemons, Aaron McGruder, Creator of “The Boondocks,” Salon.com, Dec.
7, 2001
(http://archive.salon.com/people/feature/2001/12/07/mcgruder/print.html)
(visited June 6, 2003) (discussing major newspapers’ refusal to run Boondocks strips critical
of President Bush); Lisa O’Carroll, New York Times Cartoon Mocked September 11 Widows,
GUARDIAN, March 7, 2002,
http://media.guardian.co.uk/attack/story/0,1301,663312,00.html (visited Oct.
15, 2003) (discussing New York Times’ removal of Rall cartoon from Web site).
141 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 117 (contending that consideration of public
issues, protected by First Amendment, includes consideration of “works of art of many
kinds” and of a “vast array of idea of fact, of science and fiction, of poetry and prose”);
Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 304 (noting political character of much art and
literature).
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First Amendment law has always reflected a central concern with the
chilling of speech – the danger that threats or reprisals against unpopular
speakers will dissuade others from speaking their minds and challenging
the status quo. The anticommunist purges that followed the two World
Wars are only the most prominent examples of how nongovernmental
reprisals and intimidation can chill political expression.142 The present
campaign against international terrorism has brought many new examples
of this phenomenon.
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Columnists at the Grants
Pass, Oregon Daily Courier and the Texas City, Texas Sun independently
wrote columns that branded the President irresponsible and cowardly for
failing to return to Washington immediately when the attacks began.143
Dan Guthrie, a ten-year veteran of the Daily Courier, entitled his column
“When the going gets tough, the tender turn tail,” 144 while Tom Gutting
of the Sun characterized the President as “‘flying around the country like
a scared child.’”145 Each column apparently provoked strongly negative
reader reactions, and the papers subsequently fired the columnists. While
neither paper admitted to a direct connection between column and firing,
each sent strong indications that the column played a role, and neither
appears to have cited any other ground for the firing.146 At least two
California radio stations dropped left-wing commentators for criticizing
government policies on terrorism, with one station owner explaining that
“it is not in the public interest to broadcast what we consider to be
divisive and destructive material at a time when it is critical to support
our elected leaders.”147 Such reprisals in the wake of September 11 were
not limited to liberal critics. No less a conservative bastion than the
National Review fired columnist Ann Coulter after she declared on the
magazine’s Web site that the United States “should invade [Islamic]
countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity.”148
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A higher-profile media firing occurred during the Iraq War. Peter
Arnett, a top NBC news war correspondent, granted an interview to his
counterparts at Iraq’s government-controlled television network in which
he criticized the United States-led coalition’s conduct of the war. Among
other things, Arnett opined that the coalition’s initial strategy “failed
because of Iraqi resistance”149 and that his reporting on Iraqi civilian
casualties helped those who oppose the war.150 NBC initially defended
Arnett’s remarks as analysis and “professional courtesy.”151 When the
interview prompted a storm of condemnation, however, NBC quickly
shifted gears and fired its star correspondent. The network emphasized
Arnett’s airing “his personal observations and opinions” to, in essence, an
engine of enemy propaganda.152 It failed to acknowledge the irony that
Arnett apparently felt the need to voice his sour assessment of the war to
the state network of a totalitarian regime because his employer would not
air such sentiments. The war brought reprisals against reporters from
more than just their own employers. In March 2003, the Arabic-language
television network Al Jazeera broadcast images of dead and imprisoned
American soldiers in Iraq. In response, both the New York Stock
Exchange and the Nasdaq barred Al Jazeera’s financial correspondents
from the exchanges’ trading floors.153 The N.Y.S.E. told Al Jazeera’s
correspondent that an excess of reporters on the floor necessitated his
expulsion, but an exchange official stated that Al Jazeera’s reporting from
Iraq disqualified it from the ranks of “responsible news organizations.”154
Whether motivated by substantive distaste for dissent or more pragmatic
fears about losing business, all of these reprisals silenced reporters who
challenged prevailing opinion and, over a wider horizon, gave other
reporters a strong incentive to stifle reports or commentary critical of the
government.
Prominent entertainers as well have faced nongovernmental reprisals
for questioning government policies on war and terrorism. After the
September 11 attacks, numerous television stations and advertisers
temporarily boycotted the program “Politically Incorrect” after its host,
Bill Maher, stated on the program that the government’s “lobbing cruise
missiles from 2,000 miles away” was “cowardly” while “[s]taying in the

149 Jim Rutenberg, NBC News Fires Arnett Over Iraqi TV Interview, N.Y. TIMES, March
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150 See Poniewozik, supra note 118, at 71.
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Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, p. D1.
154 Purnick, supra note 151, at D1 (quoting N.Y.S.E. executive vice president for
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airplane when it hits the building” was not.155 During the Iraq War, the
National Baseball Hall of Fame cancelled a scheduled tribute to the
movie Bull Durham because one of the invited participants, actor Tim
Robbins, had criticized the government’s Iraq policy.156 Hall of Fame
President Dale Petroskey, in a letter to Robbins, explained: “we believe
your very public criticism of President Bush at this important – and
sensitive – time in our nation’s history helps undermine the U.S. position,
which ultimately could put our troops in even more danger.”157
Meanwhile, numerous radio stations – many owned by Clear Channel –
banned the Dixie Chicks’ music from the airwaves after the group’s lead
singer, Natalie Maines, sharply criticized President Bush during a London
concert.158 At least one station suspended disc jockeys for daring to play
songs by the most popular group in country music.159 Retaliation against
dissent in the entertainment world, like the direct suppression of
politically expressive art discussed above,160 impedes democratic
discourse by muffling ideas that help shape people’s political attitudes.
Nongovernmental suppression of speech has impeded political debate
during the present campaign against international terrorism, just as it
impeded debate during earlier periods of war and national emergency.
True, public discourse itself ameliorates some speech-threatening
nongovernmental actions: the Dixie Chicks became a civil libertarian
cause celebre, and the news media have grown more critical of the
administration’s Iraq policy as the occupation has dragged on. But many
important voices and ideas have disappeared without fanfare, and in any
event, resilience in the face of censorship and misinformation does not
obviate them as threats to democracy. Allowing nongovernmental
authorities to undermine political debate – especially at the moments
when the stakes of policymaking are highest – increases the danger that
our government will make unwise, democratically uninformed decisions.
That danger compels the question why federal courts have failed to
defend our democratic system by curbing nongovernmental censorship.
The next part of this article examines the doctrinal reason for that failure
155 Houpt, supra note 142, at R1 (quoting Maher). These actions may have taken their
impetus from criticism by the Bush administration. See supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
156 See Ira Berkow, The Hall of Fame Will Tolerate No Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, April 11,
2003, p. S4.
157 Id. (quoting Petroskey letter). Petroskey subsequently acknowledged that he should
have handled the situation differently, but he maintained the appropriateness of barring
dissenting political statements from the Hall of Fame, and he made no effort to restore the
invitation to Robbins. See Ira Berkow, Hall of Fame President Acknowledges Mistake, N.Y.
TIMES, April 12, 2003, p. S3.
158 See Alisa Solomon, The Big Chill, NATION, June 2, 2003, p. 17 (describing airplay
ban on Clear Channel stations).
159 See Steve Carney & Geoff Boucher, Big Radio Chain Is Whistling Dixie Again, L.A.
TIMES, May 7, 2003, sec. 5 at 2 (reporting suspension of Disc jockeys Dave Moore and Jeff
Singer by country station KKCS in Colorado Springs, Colo.).
160 See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
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– the public-private distinction in constitutional law – and proposes a
doctrinal shift that would allow courts to enjoin nongovernmental
suppression of wartime political debate.
II. FROM PRIVATE SPHERE TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY
The First Amendment is presumptively irrelevant for the numerous
recent cases, catalogued above, in which private actors during the current
national crisis have suppressed political dissent. Mainstream constitutional
theory posits a strict distinction between private actors, who are shielded
from constitutional liability and enjoy constitutional protections, and
governmental actors, who are subject to constitutional constraints against
interference with private actors’ rights.161 Most commentators agree that this
rigid public-private distinction cannot form a coherent basis for
constitutional adjudication. Nonetheless, the distinction persists as a central
element in the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, leaving
expressive freedom unprotected from private suppression.162 This part
considers why, and to what extent, the public-private distinction should
matter in constitutional law. The first section summarizes the Court’s
doctrinal embodiment of the public-private distinction – the state action
doctrine – and the normative arguments offered in defense of the distinction.
The second section sets forth the principal critiques of the public-private
distinction. The third section develops a methodology for incorporating the
distinction into constitutional jurisprudence. My conclusion is that courts, in
adjudicating constitutional rights claims, should presumptively insulate from
constitutional claims only the personal actions of individuals and should
presumptively extend constitutional rights only to individuals.
This
approach would honor both our substantive understandings of constitutional
rights and our strongest instincts about the value of personal integrity. The
161 My focus in the discussion that follows on the public-private distinction’s function of
shielding private actors from constitutional liability should not obscure its equally
important function of constraining government action. Under the public rights theory of
expressive freedom, judicious governmental regulation can play a critical role in advancing
First Amendment values. See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1976-78. Rigid categorical
restrictions on “public” action can indiscriminately restrict regulation. See Maimon
Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of the State Action
Doctrine, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 129, 159-60 (noting potential of flexible state action doctrine
for establishing constitutionality of affirmative action programs); David A. Strauss, State
Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMM. 409 (1993) (advocating permissive
functional analysis of government regulations under state action doctrine) (hereinafter
Strauss, State Action); see also Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 268 (suggesting that
collapsing public-private distinction would require courts mechanistically to enjoin all
institutional behavior in which government may not engage under present law).
162 See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (rejecting on state action grounds claim that Internet service provider’s restriction on
unsolicited email violated First Amendment).
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final part of this article will work through this methodology in the First
Amendment context to address nongovernmental suppression of wartime
dissent.

A. The Public-Private Distinction in Action
1. The State Action Doctrine
The key provisions of the Constitution that deal with individual rights
identify the government as the object of their prohibitions. The First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”163 The Fourteenth Amendment, the
most significant guarantor of rights against the states, specifies that “no
state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”164 These textual elements have led the Supreme
Court to conclude that no constitutional cause of action lies against a
nongovernmental defendant. In the classic articulation of this rule, The
Civil Rights Cases,165 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
authorized Congress to regulate only state conduct, not private conduct.
The public-private distinction reached its legal apex in the early 20th
Century, when the Supreme Court in such cases as Lochner v. New
York166 and Coppage v. Kansas167 designated contract and property
relationships as fundamental private freedoms, shielded by the Due
Process Clause from states’ regulatory authority. After the Court
abandoned the economic substantive due process doctrine,168 the
constitutional role of the public-private distinction shifted to the question
when nominally private entities “may be appropriately characterized as
‘state actors’” by federal courts.169
Under the modern state action doctrine, the Court inquires “whether
the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a
right or privilege having its source in state authority.”170 Occasionally the
163
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Court has approached this analysis by inquiring whether a
nongovernmental defendant performs the sorts of functions traditionally
associated with government.171 More commonly, the Court has inquired
whether the nongovernmental defendant has a sufficiently close nexus
with the government – through a relationship such as contract,
authorization, or regulation – that the Court can attribute its conduct to
the government.172 Under the state action doctrine, courts may enjoin
only the state. If a court finds nongovernmental conduct entwined with
the state, it either deems the nongovernmental conduct state action173 or
directs a remedy against the government entity that has facilitated the
nongovernmental conduct.174 The Court has resolved the state action
issue on a case-by-case basis: “Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the state in private
conduct be attributed its true significance.”175
The state action doctrine has led the Court to a bewildering series of
unpredictable results that, at a minimum, bear out its characterization of
the doctrine as heavily fact-dependent. A restaurant that leases space in a
government building engages in state action when it commits racial
discrimination,176 but a club that secures a government license to sell
liquor may discriminate with impunity.177 Judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive real estate covenant is state action,178 but judicial
enforcement of a racially discriminatory condition in a will is not.179 A
landlord’s racial discrimination in renting, authorized by the state
Constitution’s repeal of local antidiscrimination laws, is state action,180
but a warehouseman’s sale of bailed goods to satisfy a lien, authorized by
the state’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, is not.181 A
creditor that uses state courts to attach a debtor’s property in an ex parte
171 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (enjoining limitation on expressive
freedom by “company town”). This “public function” approach may boil down to an implicit
balancing of rights claimants’ interests against property holders’ interests. See KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (14th ed. 2001) (suggesting
balancing interpretation of Marsh).
172 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (enjoining
racial discrimination by restaurant located in state-owned building).
173 See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-25 (holding that, when nonstate actor and state
are interdependent, nonstate actor’s conduct may be attributed to state).
174 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (barring state court from
enforcing racially restrictive real estate covenant).
175 Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
176 See Burton, 365 U.S. 715.
177 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
178 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
179 See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
180 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
181 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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proceeding is a state actor,182 but a utility that uses its state-conferred
monopolistic power to cut off a customer’s electric service without notice
or a hearing is not.183 A statewide interscholastic athletic association that
includes both public and private schools is a state actor,184 but a
nationwide interscholastic athletic association that includes both public
and private schools is not.185 Everyone agrees that public schools by
definition are state actors, and yet a nominally private school that
receives nearly all its funding from the state and must adhere to extensive
state regulations is not.186
In the First Amendment context, the Court over the past six decades
has moved from an expansive view of state action to an increasing
reluctance to impose constitutional obligations on nongovernmental
actors. In Marsh v. Alabama,187 the Court enjoined a company from
proscribing expressive activity in a “company town.” The majority found
the company town functionally indistinguishable from a traditional town
and accordingly held it to the same First Amendment standards enforced
against governments. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,188 the Court
enjoined a defamation action that threatened to chill the expression of
civil rights advocates. Although the action involved only private parties,
the Court held that judicial enforcement of a judgment for the plaintiff
would have amounted to redressable state action. More recent cases,
however, have retreated from the implications of Marsh and Sullivan. In
a sequence of cases from the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court
ultimately refused to extend First Amendment obligations to privately
owned shopping malls.189 During the same period, the Court rejected
contentions that newspapers and television networks had sufficient public
ties to make them properly subject to state regulation.190
2. Normative Defenses
182

See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
184 See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001).
185 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
186 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
187 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
188 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
189 See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that shopping center could not bar union organizers from
picketing); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (rejecting antiwar protestors’ First
Amendment challenge to exclusion from shopping mall); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (overruling Logan Valley). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 34452 and accompanying text.
190 See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down state
statute that required newspapers to grant right of reply to political candidates criticized in
print); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973) (rejecting
argument that broadcast licensee was state actor) (plurality opinion). For further
discussion of CBS v. DNC, see infra notes 353-60 and accompanying text.
183
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Beyond its textual bases, the public-private distinction implicates
normative concerns. Some of those concerns are structural, positing that
the federal government or the judicial branch is the wrong entity to place
constraints on private behavior. More significant is the argument that a
sphere of private behavior, shielded from constitutional norms, is a
necessary element of constitutional liberty. That argument, which posits
private autonomy as an irreducible minimum of rights, demands the
attention of critics, discussed in the next section, who fault the publicprivate distinction for insulating violations of rights.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court justified the state action doctrine
on grounds of federalism, striking down a federal ban on racial
discrimination in public accommodations because the ban encroached on
states’ exclusive prerogative to regulate various sorts of private
behavior.191 The Court’s willingness since that decision to expand the
boundaries of state action has tended to vary inversely with its fervor for
state prerogatives.192 Commentators occasionally reprise the argument
that courts should enforce the public private distinction in order to
preserve states’ regulatory authority.193 Several flaws undermine this
position.
First, the premise that the Constitution requires broad
preservation of state prerogatives lacks force.194 Second, even if the
191 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1882). The Court’s decision, however,
presumed not only that states had authority to protect personal freedom but that they
actually did protect freedom. See id. at 17 (holding that Fourteenth Amendment “does not
invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State
legislation”). Thus, the decision does not stand for the proposition that federal courts must
give states carte blanche to permit violations of rights.
192 For a historical analysis of this relationship, see Ronna Greff Schneider, State
Action – Making Sense Out of Chaos – an Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737
(1985).
193 See William M. Burke & David J. Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditor’s’ Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1015
(1973) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment is designed to constrain states “without
unduly interfering with the state’s primary responsibility to develop the basic positive law
that governs individuals”); Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The “Government
Function” and “Power Theory” Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 762 (arguing that state
action doctrine safeguards “the fourteenth amendment’s restriction on the authority of the
national government vis-à-vis the states regarding the regulation of the myriad
relationships that occur between one individual and another”); Kevin Cole, Federal and
State “State Action”: The Uncritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV.
327, 358-62 (1990) (articulating federalism justification for state action limitation on federal
courts); Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 781
(1989) (arguing that state action doctrine “serves the cause of federalism by limiting control
by Congress . . . and the federal courts over matters otherwise left to the states”); cf.
William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 21 (1961)
(“The local prerogative to determine which interests are worthy of legal protection should be
recognized through application of the state action requirement, but only when the local
determination is made for purposes which are constitutionally legitimate.”).
194 See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination,
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premise had force, serious doubt would remain whether federal judges
should act to preserve state prerogatives.195 Finally, even if judicial
preservation of state prerogatives were appropriate, deeming various
defendants immune from federal constitutional or statutory authority
would be an imprecise, indirect means to that end.196 The Court could
simply articulate federalism-based limits on substantive federal authority,
as in recent years it has proved more than willing to do.197
Other commentators have defended the public-private distinction in
constitutional law based on the separation of powers, arguing that courts
should not or cannot make the value judgments required to adjudicate
rights controversies.198 Michael Seidman makes a persuasive historical
case that New Deal liberals developed the contemporary state action
doctrine as a check on judicial interference with the emerging regulatory
state.199 He also explains, however, that the state action doctrine is an
incoherent device for constraining judges, because the very legal
revolution liberals sought to protect from judicial intervention
destabilized the distinction between the public and private spheres.200
46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1224-36 (2001) (criticizing arguments for broad-based protection of
state prerogatives in federal system). The notion that robust state power protects liberty is
especially dubious, given states’ historically poor record in conflicts over rights. See id. at
1229-33.
195 Several commentators have argued persuasively that various features of our
political system serve to protect state prerogatives from federal interference. See Jesse H.
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1485 (1994); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 552 (1954).
196 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 N.W.U. L. REV. 503, 54247 (1985) (hereinafter Chemerinsky, Rethinking).
197 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (announcing limit on
congressional authority to enforce Fourteenth Amendment against states).
198 See Burke & Reber, supra note 191, at 1017 (extolling state action doctrine as a
means to judicial restraint); Frank I. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal
Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (1982) (defending
state action doctrine based on “skepticism as to judges’ capacity to identify . . . rights in an
objective and principled fashion [and] conviction that the choice among competing social
and moral values and interests should be made through the political rather than the
judicial process”); Graglia, supra note 191, at 781 (arguing that state action doctrine “serves
the cause of separation of powers by limiting opportunities for judicial policymaking”);
Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMM. 329, 340 (1993) (expressing concern
about shift of legal authority from “ordinary law” to Constitution, which state action
doctrine prevents); William Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking
“Rethinking State Action,” 80 N.W.U.L. REV. 558, 563-67 (1985) (defending state action
doctrine on ground that it prevents judges from having to balance competing constitutional
interests); Strauss, State Action, supra note 159, at 416-17 (arguing that legislatures are
better equipped than courts to address various contemporary constitutional issues).
199 See Louis M. Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMM. 379, 398 (1993).
200 See id. at 399. For a discussion of problems with distinguishing the public and
private spheres, see infra section II.B.1. (describing ontological critique of public-private
distinction).

NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME
DEBATE
35
Moreover, to the extent the separation-of-powers defense rests on a
pessimistic assessment of judges’ ability to balance the interests at stake
in rights disputes, it proves too much. Judges routinely balance important
interests, and they must do so under any conception of constitutional
adjudication.201 Moreover, the argument that courts lack either the
authority or the capacity to balance rights, like the federalism argument,
ultimately depends on the dubious view that courts should constrain their
authority indirectly rather than through forthright constitutional or
prudential doctrines.202
A more forceful defense extols the public-private distinction as a
necessary precondition for liberty. The notion of a public-private distinction
relates closely to natural rights theories that hold certain spheres of human
activity inviolable.203 Robert Mnookin explains that “[t]he distinction
between public and private connects with a central tenet of liberal thought:
the insistence that because individuals have rights, there are limits on the
power of government vis-à-vis the individual.”204 Maimon Schwarzschild
praises the public-private distinction for leaving “private persons and
institutions . . . presumptively free to act in accordance with manifold and
differing values, lest some authentic values be submerged altogether.”205
Libertarian arguments for the public-private distinction depend on the
premise that government has a unique capacity to coerce behavior and
impede personal freedom. In Charles Fried’s formulation: “The state is the
law, and the law is final – even when the law appears in the humble guise of
201 See, e.g., Charles Black, Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 103 (1967) (positing that judges are amply equipped to
perform the sorts of analyses required in constitutional cases).
202 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 547 (criticizing state action
doctrine as a means of dividing authority among branches of government). For an
argument that faults the public-private distinction precisely because it prevents further
examination of social problems through constitutional discourse, see Paul S. Berman,
Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional
Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1289-1305 (2000).
203 See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1300
(1982) (noting “mutually sympathetic” character of state action doctrine and natural rights
theory); Morton J. Hor[]witz, The History of the Public / Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1423 (1982) (tracing concept of private sphere to development of natural rights
theories in 16th and 17th centuries) (hereinafter Hor[]witz, Public-Private); Gary Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1209 (1985) (linking public-private
distinction with notion in social contract theory that individuals sacrifice autonomy only on
understanding that government will remain neutral as to private relations); but see
Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 527-32 (arguing that state action doctrine is
incompatible with natural rights theory, which holds that rights predate the state);
Goodman, supra note 196, at 1332-34 (advancing process-based argument that natural
rights theory requires an activist judiciary while state action doctrine enforces judicial
restraint).
204 Robert H. Mnookin, The Public-Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982).
205 Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 137.
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a municipal ordinance.”206 Indeed, some defenders of the public-private
distinction in constitutional law insist the present state action doctrine
constrains too narrow a range of government authority to sustain a
meaningful zone of private autonomy.207
Defenses of a rigid public-private distinction in the particular context of
the First Amendment rely primarily on libertarian arguments. In the most
pointed argument for limiting expressive freedom guarantees to
governmental actors, Julian Eule and Jonathan Varat emphasize the implicit
First Amendment interests of property owners who resist First Amendment
constraints,208 and they extol property owners’ roles as “private speech
regulators” who decide independently which free speech norms to follow.209
Eule and Varat argue that extending First Amendment norms to
nongovernmental actors would amount to government-imposed “orthodoxy
of the First Amendment itself,”210 preventing “the development of alternative
perspectives and values that might contribute to adjustment of currently
prevailing First Amendment standards.”211 This naked preference for
economic markets to determine the nature and extent of expressive freedom
is a more straightforward account of the “necessary indeterminacy of public
discourse” posited by Robert Post.212 Post deems the public-private
distinction practically necessary, even if descriptively unclear, because
eliding the distinction would eviscerate the autonomy essential to
maintaining public discourse.213 Fried echoes the point that courts must
preserve nongovernmental prerogatives to censor in order to foster

206 Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 225, 236 (1992); see also Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 138 n.41 (stressing
that “even the most powerful corporation cannot directly control the armed might of the
state”).
207 See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to
the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1537, 1549
(1998) (arguing that Court’s focus on defining public sphere prevents state action doctrine
from creating “coherent zone of private autonomy”); Kay, supra note 196, at 351 (arguing
that state action doctrine fails to maintain a zone of individual autonomy because it does
not limit the reach of federal statutes or state law); see also Mark Tushnet, Shelley v.
Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383, 397 (1988) (noting that most
behavior state action doctrine restricts courts from enjoining is behavior legislatures have
power to restrict).
208 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1554-61 (discussing, among other cases, Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)). For a
discussion of state action precedents in the First Amendment area, see supra notes 185-88
and accompanying text.
209 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1605. Eule and Varat’s case for private
entities’ prerogatives to set independent free speech norms focuses intently on educational
institutions. See, e.g., id. at 1606. How strongly they would maintain their argument in the
context of noneducational entities, such as business corporations, is unclear.
210 Id. at 1617.
211 Id. at 1618.
212 Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1993).
213 This is a necessarily slim summation of the complex discussion in id. at 1125-28.

NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME
DEBATE
37
214

independent conceptions of expressive freedom, and he brushes off the
dangers of private censorship with the assurance that private law will prevent
excesses.215
Defenses of the public-private distinction in the First Amendment
context tend to posit individual autonomy as the chief value underlying
expressive freedom,216 and they maintain that government generally should
allow the economic market to distribute expressive opportunities and to
dictate the availability of information.217 These are hallmarks of the private
rights theory of expressive freedom, which treats the First Amendment as a
negative protection of expressive autonomy against governmental
interference.218 The public-private distinction is integral to the private rights
theory in several ways. The distinction underwrites the private rights
theory’s individuated notion of expressive freedom as analogous to a

214 See Fried, supra note 204, at 237 (arguing that private restrictions on speech “issue
from the limiting person’s own exercise of liberty” and also “derive from other rights that
the limiter might have”).
215 See id. at 234-35.
216 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1621 (emphasizing “self-development, selfdefinition, and self-determination values” as “among the most powerful reasons for
according the protection of speech such a high priority in the public realm”); Fried, supra
note 204, at 233 (asserting that “[f]reedom of expression is properly based on autonomy”);
Post, supra note 210, at 1118-19 (stating that “[t]he enterprise of public discourse . . . rests
on the value of autonomy”); see also John H. Garvey, Private Power and the Constitution, 10
CONST. COMM. 311, 316 (1993) (“If everything we do and think is state action, the freedom
of speech rests on an illusion); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship
Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 274-77 (1996) (arguing that individual autonomy
maintained by public-private distinction is essential to democracy). Even Vincent Blasi,
who enlists the public-private distinction in his argument that the First Amendment allows
the press to check government misconduct for the overall good of society, contrasts the
individualist tilt of his theory with Meiklejohn’s collectivist commitments. See Blasi, supra
note 93, at 538-41 (defending public-private distinction); id. at 562 (criticizing Meiklejohn
for “hostil[ity] to many of the most prominent manifestations of individualism”).
217 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1600 (“Frequently, when the government
giveth, it simultaneously taketh away.”); Fried, supra note 204, at 251 (maintaining that
the only neutral device for distributing expressive resources is “a society in which a
significant portion of the resources are [sic] in private hands and beyond the reach of
government altogether”); Post, supra note 210, at 1118 (arguing that “[t]he state ought not
to be empowered to control the agenda of public discourse”); see also Gey, supra note 214, at
277-80 (warning against inevitable government excess in speech regulation); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 979-82 (1995) (resisting
conflation of economic and expressive marketplaces aimed at justifying regulation). Fried
wins the prize for dogmatism on this point by tying advocates of government involvement in
the distribution of expressive opportunities to “apologists for Marxism-Leninism.” Fried,
supra note 204, at 252. In contrast, other defenders of the public-private distinction
gingerly acknowledge the propriety of government intervention to advance expressive
freedom in narrow areas. See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1600 (approving some
government regulation of campaign finance and broadcast licensing); Post, supra note 210,
at 1132-33 (suggesting that some government regulation of campaign finance might be
appropriate).
218 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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property right rather than a social good directed at effective government.219
The distinction’s formalism parallels the theory’s denial of any affirmative
entitlement to expressive opportunity and its special solicitude for the free
speech claims of powerful institutions.220 Most directly, the distinction’s
barrier against government interference with private behavior enables the
theory’s rejection of government regulation to advance expressive
freedom.221
The libertarian arguments in favor of the public-private distinction
provide the most forceful normative claims for the distinction. Personal
freedom is the very interest that animates criticism of the state action
doctrine, because of the doctrine’s frequent effect of invalidating legal claims
of constitutional rights.222 Defeating the libertarian defense requires a
critique that demonstrates the public-private distinction’s negative effect on
rights. Accordingly, the next section turns to the distinction’s critics.
B.Three Stages of Criticizing the Public-Private
Distinction
Critiques of the public-private distinction as a feature of our legal
system have operated in three principal modes. The largest set of
critiques, proceeding from insights of legal realism, has exposed the
distinction as ontologically incoherent. Another type of critique, typified
by observations of the Critical Legal Studies movement, has
characterized the distinction as ideologically biased, advancing the
political and economic agendas of the socially powerful. Recent critics
have sought to accommodate the insights of the realist and critical
perspectives to the reality that the public-private distinction continues to
exert a powerful hold over the popular and legal imagination. These new
critics have sought to reshape the ideological contours of the publicprivate distinction to satisfy a variety of normative concerns. I analogize
the three stages of dealing with the public-private distinction to three
stages through which psychologists posit people as moving when coping
with grief: denial, anger, and acceptance.223

219 See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1953-54 (discussing private rights theory’s
individuated model of expressive freedom).
220 See id. at 1954-56 (discussing private rights theory’s formal conception of rights).
221 See id. at 1957-58 (discussing private rights theory’s distrust of government
regulation).
222 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 507-11.
223 See generally ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969). Just as the
literal stages of grief are not always as distinct or as universal as some have assumed, the
following discussion will show that the critiques of the public-private distinction analogous
to those stages are not mutually exclusive and that some of them intermingle in particular
arguments. The discussion that follows does not pretend to set forth every significant
analysis of the public-private distinction, but it describes and assesses representative
accounts of the major critiques.
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1. Denial: The Ontological Critique
Several generations of legal scholars have established that the rigid
public-private distinction, manifested in the Court’s state action doctrine,
cannot do its supposed job: maintaining a principled distinction between
actors that should be subject to constitutional constraint and those that
should not. The Court has fanned this ontological critique with its
numerous seemingly irreconcilable holdings about the character of
nongovernmental action.224 Rather than even attempting to reconcile
these uncomfortably disparate holdings, the Court insists it is engaged in
a principled, albeit necessarily fact-sensitive, analysis.225 Ontological
critics point to the Court’s contortions as demonstrating how the terms
“public” and “private” in constitutional law necessarily converge until no
meaningful distinction is possible.226 They charge that the Court’s
unprincipled distinctions expose “state action” as “nothing more than a
catch-phrase.”227
Under the familiar positivist understanding of rights, which holds that
all legal prerogatives and duties result from state policy decisions, the
notion that any right can exist free from governmental involvement is
incoherent.228 We may be able to distinguish nongovernmental actors’
conduct from the government’s conduct at a simple descriptive level, but
in assessing constitutional claims, we can never extricate
nongovernmental actors’ behavior from government prohibition or
facilitation.229 “It has long been clear that the state can violate the
224

See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
226 See Duncan Kennedy, The States of Decline of the Public / Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354-57 (1982) (describing convergence of public and private
categories).
227 Black, supra note 199, at 88.
228 See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 103 (1987) (“The notion
that there is a meaningful private domain, dominated by consensual contract, obviously
depends on ignoring the extent to which the state inevitably regulates the steps one can
take to induce others to contract.”); Brest, supra note 201, at 1301 (explaining tension
between legal positivism and notion that rights can be violated absent state involvement);
Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 520-27 (same); Harold W. Horowitz, The
Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 SO. CAL. L. REV.
208, 209 (1957) (contending that “whenever, and however, a state gives legal consequences
to transactions between private persons there is ‘state action’”); Cass R. Sunstein, State
Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 465, 466-67 (2002) (explaining dependence of
“negative rights,” notably freedoms of property and contract, on government action)
(hereinafter Sunstein, State Action); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex.
L. Rev. 347, 367 (1963) (“it is difficult to conceive of situations where state action is not
present”); see also Peller, supra note 201, at 1226-40 (describing early critiques of publicprivate distinction in deconstructive strand of legal realism); but see Burke & Reber, supra
note 191, at 1035-39 (criticizing conflation of state actions and omissions).
229 Failure to appreciate this difference accounts for Frank Goodman’s assertion that
225
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[Fourteenth Amendment] by ‘inaction’ as well as by ‘action.’”230 A
classic example is the California constitutional provision struck down in
Reitman v. Mulkey,231 which repealed all local ordinances that banned
discrimination in housing and prohibited enactment of such ordinances in
the future. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Reitman, argued that the
provision had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it did no
more “than would have California’s failure to pass any such
antidiscrimination statutes in the first instance.”232 In his seminal
extended metaphor, Charles Black responded that the provision had not
“‘merely’ failed to throw the life-preserver” but rather had “put the lifepreserver out of convenient reach, so as not to be tempted to throw it, and
. . . passed the word down the line to those [the state] commands, that the
life-preserver is not to be thrown.”233
The Fourteenth Amendment’s textual limitation to “state action”234
settles nothing, because assessment of the government’s liability must
encompass all of the active and passive ways in which government can
“deprive” a citizen of a right or “deny” equal protection.235 Indeed, Erwin
Chemerinsky has argued persuasively that the Framers textually limited
the federal Constitution’s reach to governmental action only on the
the case of nongovernmental actors’ expressly unlawful conduct provides an undeniable
instance of purely private conduct, thus demonstrating the viability of the state action
doctrine. See Goodman, supra note 196, at 1343-44. When government prohibits private
behavior and enforces that prohibition, it acts in a manner that should obviate any need for
a constitutional claim against the behavior. When government fails to prohibit private
behavior, or fails to enforce a legal prohibition, it acts in a manner likely to inspire a
constitutional claim.
230 Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev.
473, 481 (1962). Mark Tushnet posits that the intuitive distinction between action and
inaction may have much to do with the persistence of the state action doctrine, and he
suggests the relationship may be somewhat circular, with the intuition owing much to the
presence of the state action doctrine. See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403-04.
231 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
232 Id. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
233 Black, supra note 199, at 83 (footnote omitted).
234 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
235 See Black, supra note 199, at 84 (“[T]he question is not whether state action is
present, but what the thrust and effect of the state action is.”); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. &
John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Action”
Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 229 (contending that the relevant issue is not
“whether a state has ‘acted,’ but whether a state has ‘deprived’ someone of a guaranteed
right”); Henkin, supra note 228, at 481 (contending that relevant issue “is not whether the
state has ‘acted,’ but . . . whether because of the character of state involvement, or the
relation of the state to the private acts in issue, there has been a denial for which the state
should be held responsible”); Horowitz, supra note 226, at 211 (“The critical issue here is
not the presence or absence of state action; it is the far more difficult question of giving
meaning to the phrase ‘deny the equal protection of the laws.’”); Sunstein, State Action,
supra note 226, at 467-68 (calling for refocusing of analysis from state action question to
meaning of substantive constitutional guarantees). The First Amendment’s narrower
description of the prohibited action – “Congress shall make no law” – might appear less
likely to harbor the negative predicate, but the Court has long since expanded those words
to encompass governmental action other than lawmaking, creating a meaning as
encompassing as that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions.
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understanding that individuals possessed natural rights, which states were
bound to protect – an understanding that rendered constitutional
safeguards against nongovernmental violations of rights superfluous.236
On this understanding, the Constitutional text states no affirmative bar on
holding nongovernmental actors to rights guarantees; at most it suggests
such a bar by negative implication. The reality of nongovernmental
institutions’ power to deny expressive freedom precludes allowing such
an implication to rule constitutional doctrine. Thus, the Court’s decisions
in Shelley v. Kramer237 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan238 reflect a
necessary understanding that judicial enforcement of “private” legal
interests amounts to state action.
Complementing the positivist insight that every circumstance
involves state action is the reality that nongovernmental entities often
rival or exceed the government’s power to deny the values reflected in the
Constitution’s guarantees of rights.239 Particularly in the employment
setting, nongovernmental authorities often exert far greater control over
individual behavior than government does.240 The Supreme Court on
occasion has acknowledged the coercive capacity of nongovernmental
actors to deny rights, as in the ultimate holding of the White Primary
Cases241 that a political party acted unconstitutionally when it excluded
236 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 511-16. Critics of the state action
doctrine have cited this theory in defending the outcome in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1882), maintaining that the Court there thought no constitutional remedy necessary
because the state would vindicate its citizens’ rights. See id. at 516; Horowitz, supra note
226, at 211.
237 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding judicial enforcement of racially restrictive real estate
covenant to be state action that violated equal protection rights).
238 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding state court’s enforcement of libel law to be state action
that violated First Amendment rights).
239 See KELMAN, supra note 226, at 109 (positing that “one can readily see people’s
relationship to local government authority as at least as voluntary as one’s relationship to
private corporate authority”); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 510-11 (noting
that “the concentration of wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large
corporations, makes the effect of private actions in certain cases virtually indistinguishable
from the impact of governmental conduct”) (footnote omitted); Robert L. Hale, Rights Under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals,
6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 628 (1946) (“Employers or unions may as effectively as the state
itself bar Negroes from certain occupations.”); Tushnet, supra note 205, at 392 (refuting
argument that government stands in unique position to infringe personal freedoms); see
also Hor[]witz, Public-Private, supra note 201, at 1428 (tying attacks on public-private
distinction in late 19th and early 20th centuries to rise of powerful corporate entities). For a
thorough discussion of corporate power’s implications for community life, see CHARLES E.
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).
240 See CHARLES REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 30 (1995) (“Employers can and do
demand a degree of subservience and conformity that public government could never
require. Economic punishment is a more effective weapon than the punishment inflicted by
law.”).
241 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also Morse
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African-American voters from the party’s primary elections.242 More
recently, the Court has acknowledged that private cable operators’ power
as “gatekeepers” of public access to information justifies greater lenience
in reviewing regulations of their programming decisions.243 The Court’s
failure to analyze the intent of governmental actors who facilitate certain
nominally private denials of rights also suggests that nongovernmental
actors can exert constitutionally cognizable coercive authority.244
Acknowledging nongovernmental institutions’ independent power
unmasks as a formalism the argument that government’s unique power to
deny rights justifies the public-private distinction.245
The ontological critique provides a powerful response to the
libertarian argument that undergirds the public-private distinction. If
state power underwrites all behavior, then the liberty the state action
doctrine protects stands on the same footing as the liberty the doctrine
makes vulnerable to nongovernmental encroachments. We can no longer
distinguish easily between rights holders and rights violators; rather,
adjudication of constitutional rights disputes necessarily requires
balancing the putative plaintiff’s liberty interest against the putative
defendant’s liberty interest.246 As Erwin Chemerinsky recognizes, “the
state action doctrine is an absurd basis for choosing between the two
liberties,”247 because the doctrine ignores the substance of the interests at
stake in favor of an ultimately meaningless inquiry into the defendant’s
relationship to the state.
v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (plurality opinion) (treating political
party as state actor under Voting Rights Act).
242 For a discussion of the problems political parties pose for the public-private
distinction, see Magarian, supra note 9, at 2043-50.
243 See Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994) (Turner I) (“The
First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not
disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict,
through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information
and ideas.”).
244 Jesse Choper notes the tension between cases in which the Court has found equal
protection violations based on the actions of nongovernmental parties – such as Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) –
and subsequent decisions, notably Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that condition
equal protection violations on discriminatory intent. See Choper, supra note 191, at 769-72.
Because the ultimate government actors in the state action decisions presumably lacked
discriminatory intent, we can resolve the tension only by reading the state action decisions
as having found the nongovernmental actors themselves constitutionally liable. See id. at
776; see also Glennon & Nowak, supra note 233, at 255-57 (discussing Court’s confusion
about whether state action inquiry goes to action or actor).
245 The private power insight forces defenders of the public-private distinction into a
posture of relativism. See, e.g., Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 138 (“[W]hich particular
private powers are ‘too powerful’ is generally a matter of controversy. It is difficult to
imagine how ‘too powerful’ could be defined as a matter of constitutional principle.”). They
simply deem government categorically different, denying any need to prove their position.
246 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 536-38 (dismantling argument that
state action doctrine protects liberty interests).
247 Id. at 537.
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2. Anger: Ideological Critiques
Building on the ontological critics’ insight that public and private
spheres are legally indistinguishable, a distinct set of critiques of the
public-private distinction contends that our legal system has maintained
the distinction as an ideological construct. On this view, the ontological
critique points the way to a deeper understanding that the public-private
distinction in constitutional law serves entrenched interests by preventing
departures from established arrangements of power.248 The distinction
elevates the rights of powerful institutions over those of less powerful
individuals while preventing government, particularly courts, from
intervening in the conflict on the individuals’ behalf.249 As Paul Brest
notes: “The state action doctrine . . . has seldom been used to shelter
citizens from coercive federal or judicial power. More often, it has been
employed to protect the autonomy of business enterprises against the
claims of consumers, minorities, and other relatively powerless
citizens.”250 Courts employ the public-private distinction to mark public
power as the only threat to constitutional freedoms while concealing
private exercises of coercive authority.251 This process perpetuates
economic, racial, and gender inequities.
Legal realists and their inheritors in the critical legal studies movement
have advanced this ideological critique in economic terms. Aiming at the
heart of the traditionally conceptualized private sphere, these critics have
emphasized the structures of coercion and domination inherent in the
supposedly nongovernmental domains of property and contract. They
emphasize the historical development of the public-private distinction as an
advanced capitalist legal device to safeguard private transactions from
248 Karl Klare’s deconstruction of the public-private distinction’s role in labor law
illustrates well the progression from the ontological critique to an indictment of the
distinction as ideologically driven. See Karl E. Klare, The Public / Private Distinction in
Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).
249 See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech Is Better, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1635, 1639
(1998) (“Traditional law, as embodied in the state action doctrine, creates a bright-line rule
that the private institution always wins and the individual fired or disciplined by it for
expression always loses.”) (hereinafter Chemerinsky, More Speech).
250 Brest, supra note 201, at 1330; see also Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403 (positing
that, “given our society’s stated commitment to norms of equality, a great deal of the way
things actually are would not survive” elimination of the state action doctrine)..
251 See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence – A First Step by Way of
the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 395 (1983)
(explaining how then-Justice Rehnquist’s conception of public-private distinction made
power “a derivative, and not an originating, concept”); Peller, supra note 201, at 1288
(explaining that, under public-private distinction, “democratic political practice . . . is
represented as having a monopoly on social power” while “[e]verything outside the purview
of this realm . . . is not viewed as an exercise of social power”).
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redistributive initiatives, which may be framed as constitutional rights
claims.252 Karl Klare’s exhaustive survey of labor law doctrine leads him to
conclude that the public-private distinction as applied to labor disputes
serves “the effort to induce the belief that workers should be denied power
and participation in industrial life.”253 Given the Court’s repeated tendency
to invoke the state action doctrine to shield such institutions as utilities,254
bailees,255 and medical facilities256 from constitutional liability,
commentators emphasize how the distinction aids powerful institutions in
fending off rights claims brought by individuals.257 In short, the state action
doctrine safeguards the status quo.
Invocations of the state action doctrine to block constitutional claims
have often provided cover for institutionalized racism. 258 Professor Black
maintained near the height of the Civil Rights Era that the state action
doctrine served only that purpose.259 Although almost all of the Supreme
Court decisions that have appreciably expanded the scope of “state
action” rebuffed acts of discrimination against African Americans,260
252 See Hor[]witz, Public-Private, supra note 201, at 1424-26 (demonstrating that legal
concepts of public and private crystallized only with consolidation of market capitalism in
the 19th century); Peller, supra note 201, at 1194-1207 (tracing development of publicprivate distinction in 19th Century liberty-of-contract jurisprudence).
253 Klare, supra note 246, at 1418.
254 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that statelicensed monopolistic utility was not bound to provide procedural due process when it shut
off customer’s electric service for nonpayment).
255 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that warehouse’s sale of
goods it held to satisfy lien under Uniform Commercial Code not state action).
256 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that government
reimbursements for care of Medicaid patients did not subject nursing home’s transfer of
those patients to less expensive facilities to procedural due process requirements).
257 See REICH, supra note 238, at 35-38 (discussing how corporations’ freedom from
constitutional liability allows them to undermine personal freedoms); Casebeer, supra note
249, at 422-23 (contending that state action doctrine “masks classist protection of capital
including warehouses, private utilities, private drinking clubs, private hospitals and private
schools”) (footnotes omitted); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 539 ([A]llowing
the concept of state action to determine when rights are protected undermines liberty by
allowing all private invasions of rights, even when the balance completely favors the
victims.”).
258 See Hale, supra note 237, at 639 (charging that state action doctrine “makes a
mockery of the Court’s solemn declaration that Negroes have a constitutional right not to be
segregated”); Strauss, State Action, supra note 159, at 411-14 (describing obstructionist role
of state action limitation during Civil Rights Era).
259 See Black, supra note 199, at 90 (contending that state action doctrine’s “one
practical function” in constitutional law was to “immunize[] racist prejudices from
constitutional control”); see also id. at 70 (“‘Separate but equal’ and ‘no state action’ – these
fraternal twins have been the Medusan caryatids upholding racial injustice.”).
260 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding judicial
assignment of liability for defamation to be state action that violated First Amendment,
where defendants in defamation action were African-American civil rights advocates);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding exclusion of AfricanAmerican customers by restaurant in government-owned building to be state action that
violated Equal Protection Clause); Reitman v. Mulkey, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding state
constitutional provision that prohibited ordinances barring private racial discrimination in
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critical scholars have demonstrated that systems of private ordering
continue to disadvantage African Americans and other minority groups
by insulating oppressive features of the status quo from legal challenge.261
Critical race theory posits that limiting constitutional protections to the
public sphere makes no sense in a society that disadvantages people of
color in most other aspects of life.262 Dividing the world into public and
private spheres forces constitutional challengers to overcome a putatively
“common sense” distinction that actually owes its status to past judicial
decisions.263 The state action doctrine acts as a shield, allowing courts to
avoid balancing underlying competing constitutional interests.264
Furthermore, critical race theorists contend that the denial of a private
cause of action based on equal protection grounds, combined with the
protection of other constitutional provisions – primarily due process and
First Amendment protections – creates a “private right to discriminate.”265
Not only does this right legitimate private discrimination, it hinders
passage of antidiscrimination legislation in areas such as economic
relations.266 Finally, critical race theorists emphasize the realist insight
that governmental facilitation and protection of discriminatory conduct
amounts to a higher level of state action that the courts have still refused
to recognize.267
Feminist legal theory has emphasized the role of the public-private
distinction in sustaining patriarchal authority. The distinction fosters an
housing to be state action that violated Equal Protection Clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (holding judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant to be state action
that violated Equal Protection Clause).
261 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1998)
(discussing tendency of private social arrangements to perpetuate inequalities and evade
constitutional checks).
262 See Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against
Racism: Perspectives from Labor and Civil Rights Law, 61 ORE. L. REV. 157, 180 (1982)
(discussing connection between public/private and substance/form dichotomies in relation to
race cases); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 446-47 (1990) (highlighting idea that privacy has
more worth to those with the means of taking advantage of it).
263 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 1991 STAN. L. REV. 1,
12-14 (arguing that division along public and private lines is a normative process that
obscures political reasoning behind designations).
264 See Lawrence, supra note 260, at 446-47 (1990) (contending that state action
doctrine provides formalistic basis for resolving substantive conflicts between constitutional
values).
265 Gotanda, supra note 261, at 10-12 (illustrating that there exists an area where
neither judicial decisions nor legislative enactments may permissibly prevent private
discrimination).
266 Id. at 11-12.
267 See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2378-79 (arguing that characterization of racist speech as
private ignores both passive and active roles state plays in its propagation).
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illusion that women possess autonomy while simultaneously insulating
structures that oppress women from legal challenges.268 “Freedom from
public intervention,” states Catharine MacKinnon, “coexists uneasily with
any right that requires social preconditions [in order] to be meaningfully
delivered.”269 In rape law, the public-private distinction discourages legal
attention to sexual violence, even though such violence represents the
dominant exercise of coercive power in many women’s lives, because
rape results from nominally private action.270 At the same time, the law
treats consent to sex as presumptively voluntary by locating sex in the
private sphere, where people are presumed to make autonomous
choices.271 Legal approaches to family life depend on a subdivision of the
private sphere into the distinct domains of the economic marketplace and
the home. Women have historically faced exclusion from the public
sphere and the marketplace,272 while the law has shielded the “private”
domain of the home from many forms of regulation.273 Thus, even though
the workplace has become subject to substantial government regulation,
the law ignores many women’s status as unpaid full-time laborers in their
own homes because it identifies the home with the private sphere.274 On
the same basis, the legal idea of family privacy insulates many marital
conflicts from legal regulation or liability.275
Laying bare the ideological skeleton of the public-private distinction
provides additional responses to the distinction’s libertarian defenders.
The social fact that private institutions often match or exceed
268 See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public-Private Distinction, 45 CAL. L. REV.
1,17, 20 (1992) (summarizing feminist accounts of ways in which public-private distinction
conceals women’s lack of volition and structural oppression).
269 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989).
270 See KELMAN, supra note 226, at 199 (emphasizing pervasiveness of sexual violence
in women’s lives); MACKINNON, supra note 267, at 191 (“To confront the fact that women
have no privacy is to confront the intimate degradation of women as the public order.”). For
a thorough discussion of background features of state rape laws that exacerbate women’s
vulnerability to sexual violence, see Michelle A. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the
Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 907, 924-39 (2001).
271 See Peller, supra note 201, at 1195 (comparing liberty of contract and sexual consent
as ideological constructs based on presumptions of privacy). This same view of sex as
voluntary supports the framing of abortion rights in privacy terms. See MACKINNON, supra
note 267, at 184-94 (criticizing privacy basis for abortion rights on ground that sex for
women is not a matter of free choice); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s
Subordination and the Role of Law, in DAVID KAIRYS ED., THE POLITICS OF LAW 151, 157-60
(2nd ed. 1990) (same).
272 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 269, at 152-54 (presenting historical and
conceptual overview of women’s legal exclusion from public sphere).
273 See Gavison, supra note 266, at 21-22 (discussing home-market division); Taub &
Schneider, supra note 269, at 154-58 (presenting historical and conceptual overview of
absence of law in private sphere).
274 See MACKINNON, supra note 267, at 67 (explaining advocacy of wages for
housework).
275 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 269, at 154-56 (discussing property rules, tort
law, rape, and battery).
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government’s capacity to threaten personal freedom becomes, in the
ideological critics’ analysis, more than a mere refutation of the publicprivate distinction’s logic. Rather, the ideological critics view that
seeming illogic as a smokescreen for a deliberate maintenance of standing
power relationships.277
They add that private institutions, unlike
governments, are not politically accountable to citizens.278 Thus, they
contend that governmental intervention in nongovernmental relationships
can be highly beneficial and that judicial enforcement of rights against
nongovernmental institutions can be constitutionally valid.279 They also
maintain that courts should have authority to hold private entities
themselves liable for rights violations, rather than having to assign
liability to state actors with only indirect responsibility for the
violations.280 The ideological critique reveals that libertarian defenders of
the public-private distinction rely on a politically charged vision of
“liberty.”
The ideological critics build on the insights of the ontological critics,
taking realist insights about the incoherence of the public-private
distinction in what is nominally a more radical direction. Unlike the
ontological critique, however, the ideological critique implies a basis for
partially reconciling the concept of the private in constitutional law. To
condemn the state action doctrine as ideologically determined
presupposes, at a minimum, that the public-private distinction has some
coherent meaning. That premise, in turn, opens up the possibility of
reconceptualizing the distinction in constitutional law to serve more
desirable normative ends. This is the direction in which the final
significant critique of the public private distinction has moved.
276

See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
See Casebeer, supra note 249, at 422 (contending that the Court, by enforcing state
action limitation, “uses an incoherent doctrine to hide a necessarily unstable sphere of
private right protected by the Constitution”); Peller, supra note 201, at 1208-13 (explaining
circularity of state action analysis as reflecting ideological perspective that views private
sphere as temporally preceding public sphere).
278 See REICH, supra note 238, at 37 (“The rules that corporations make and enforce are
not adopted democratically, nor are they enforced with the fairness required by due process
of law.”); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 511 (emphasizing need for judicial
protection against infringements of rights by nongovernmental actors); Tushnet, supra note
205, at 392 (contending that freedom from political accountability can render corporations
more threatening to rights than government).
279 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 247, at 1637-38 (describing value of
imposing governmental free speech norms on certain private institutions).
280 See Casebeer, supra note 249, at 413 (“Responsibility for the consequences of public
power should not cease merely because those injured by its exercise cannot find a state
actor triggerman in a situation where the public power organizes a pattern of acceptable
social relations.”); but see Larry Alexander, The Public-Private Distinction and
Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMM. 361, 371-72 (1993) (asserting
that “any constitutional challenge to the exercise of private power can and should be
recharacterized as a constitutional challenge to . . . background laws”).
277
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3.

Acceptance: Rehabilitating the Public-Private
Distinction

The ontological and ideological critiques of the public-private distinction
in constitutional law carry great persuasive force. Those critiques, however,
have permeated the legal literature for years, and the distinction still occupies
a central place in the jurisprudence of constitutional rights. As no less
ambitious a critical scholar than Mark Tushnet has acknowledged, the
persistence of a legal doctrine against years of withering critical attacks
strongly suggests “that the doctrine is doing something to which the critics
are not attending.”281 Recent analysis of the public-private distinction in
constitutional law has therefore focused on justifying the distinction in light
of the complaints against it. Unfortunately, many such efforts have made
one of two mistakes.
The first mistake, the “useful fiction” fallacy, has been to retain the
facade of something called “the public-private distinction” while building
an entirely different doctrine behind it. William Marshall, for example,
argues that courts require some sort of “guideline” to avoid the
difficulties of balancing competing interests.282 He nominates the state
action doctrine for the task: “Given the extreme difficulty of choosing
between competing rights in the first place, perhaps the decision to
insulate private activity from constitutional scrutiny is justified as a way
to avoid forcing judges to make impossible decisions.”283 A more
pessimistic, and perhaps more forthright, version of Marshall’s argument
is Tushnet’s suggestion that constitutional law needs the public-private
distinction because our jurisprudence has failed to generate what should
stand in the distinction’s place – a substantive understanding of
constitutional rights.284 Conversely, Robert Glennon and John Nowak
attempt to portray the state action doctrine as an implicit balancing
analysis, calling it “merely the Court’s chosen manner of determining
whether the challenged nongovernmental act is compatible with the

281 Tushnet, supra note 205, at 391; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1698 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that persistence of public-private
distinction renders critics “both correct and irrelevant”). For an examination of possible
explanations for the vitality of the public-private distinction, see Berman, supra note 200,
at 1284-89.
282 See Marshall, supra note 196, at 363.
283 Id. (footnote omitted). Marshall decries the idea that judges should replace the state
action doctrine with a balancing of constitutional interests on the ground that such
balancing “will create a class of constitutional ‘losers.’” Id. He fails to consider the
numerous constitutional claimants who “lose” when courts dismiss their claims under the
state action doctrine.
284 See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403 (“The state action doctrine, incoherent though it
may be, is perhaps a useful mask to disguise the incoherence of substantive constitutional
law.”); see also Horwitz, Rights, supra note 73, at 405 & n.74 (explaining that state action
doctrine preserves traditional liberal distinction between social and political equality).
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substantive guarantees of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”
One problem
with treating the public-private distinction as a useful fiction is the
increased danger that courts will overreach by misrepresenting what they
are doing.286 Another problem is that this sort of subterfuge implicitly
attributes the persistence of the distinction to ignorance, and its architects
make the suspect assumption that they can fool the ignorant while
advancing some preferred value.
The second mistake, the “square one” fallacy, entails reconstructing
the rigid public-private distinction in all its incoherent, ideologically
charged ignominy.
Christopher Stone, for instance, portrays the
obligations traditionally associated with government as mechanisms to
enforce virtuous behavior.287 For Stone, extending this enforcement to a
“private” sphere, specifically corporations, would “unacceptably extend
the power and reach of government.”288 Accordingly, Stone draws a
public-private boundary that relieves entities not generally perceived as
“public” of “public” obligations289 and “most nearly assigns the [‘public’
liability] burden to general revenues.”290 Richard Kay likewise bases his
analysis of the state action doctrine on an assertion about the special
danger of governmental power. Kay acknowledges the ontological
critique291 and the critical insight that nongovernmental power centers
have achieved great prominence in contemporary society.292 He argues,
however, that the Constitution, unlike other sources of legal authority,
should constrain only the formal making and enforcement of laws.293 Kay
285 Glennon & Nowak, supra note 233, at 229; see also Steve Bachmann & Andrew
Weltchek, Book Review, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1078, 1086 (1983) (arguing for maintenance of
public-private distinction “as a tool to be used for political protection from various forms of
persecution, if for no other reason”) (reviewing DAVID KAIRYS ED., THE POLITICS OF LAW (1st
ed. 1982)); Graglia, supra note 191, at 784 (extolling reinvigoration of state action doctrine
as an “essential, albeit illogical” limit on “the application of unjustifiable constitutional
restrictions that have resulted from decades of judicial hyperactivity”).
286 See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 404 (criticizing “Bickelian prudentialist” claim that
state action doctrine is a useful fiction).
287 Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private
Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1494-96 (1982).
288 Id. at 1494.
289 See id. at 1497 (“[I]t is true that General Motors is big and powerful; nonetheless,
its actions are not likely to be interpreted as the expression of the collective will.”).
290 Id. at 1498.
291 “Maintenance of the public-private distinction . . . creates an inescapable problem of
self-reference: the Constitution is concerned only with public things and not with private
things. The determination of the content of the categories of public and private things is a
public thing.” Kay, supra note 196, at 337 (footnote omitted).
292 See id. at 350 (noting argument “that the relative dangers from public and
ostensibly private sources of power may be considerably different today than when the
relevant constitutional provisions were enacted”).
293 See id. at 342-43 (defending limitation of constitutional law to field of “lawmaking”
as necessary to preserve “distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law”).
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justifies this rigid limitation as providing “the security that may be
derived from the existence of stable and knowable limits on the power of
the state.”294 The problem with the square one fallacy is that those who
commit it, while paying lip service to critical insights, end up
reconstructing the public-private distinction as a device to insulate
entrenched ideas about limited government and corporate license.
If rehabilitation of the constitutional public-private distinc tion, in light of
the distinction’s conceptual weaknesses, should not take the form of a façade
for preferred values or a reconstruction of fallacies, what form should it take?
Any attempt to answer this question requires an acknowledgement that the
analysis has too many and broad implications to allow confidence that any
theory will be generally valid or free of unforeseen flaws. The reason to
forge on past this hesitation is that, once we realize the inadequacy of the
doctrinal status quo, the question requires an answer.
C.Developing a Useful Role for the Public-Private
Distinction in Constitutional Adjudication
Our constitutional system reflexively gives the abstract, formal idea of
“the private” a centrality that properly belongs to a closely related but
significantly different idea the integrity of natural persons. Our deepest
intuitions about the substance and limits of constitutional rights concern
individuals’ decisions to behave as they choose, and courts’ understandings
about constitutional rights should reflect those intuitions. Shifting our
attention from the abstract private sphere to the concept of personal integrity
has important consequences both for determining which entities bear
constitutional obligations and for defining the substance of constitutional
rights. Once the idea of personal integrity underwrites our notion of
immunity from constitutional liability, nongovernmental institutions have no
special, presumptive freedom from constitutional obligations, as they do
under the conventional public-private distinction. At the same time, personal
integrity provides a sounder basis than the bald designation “private” for
asserting constitutional rights. This section considers these ideas in the
abstract; Part III uses them to build a new First Amendment model for
dealing with nongovernmental assaults on wartime political debate.
Consideration of a genuine role for the public-private distinction in
constitutional adjudication begins with a key insight of the distinction’s
critics: Constitutional adjudication should focus on the substance of the
asserted constitutional right at issue. The traditional state action inquiry errs
in replacing that substantive analysis with a formalistic inquiry into the
defendant’s identity. This critical insight has both descriptive and normative
dimensions. Descriptively, ontological critics insist that the state action
doctrine is only comprehensible by reference to substantive theories of
294

Id. at 360.
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rights. Laurence Tribe posits that the Court’s rejection after 1937 of the
unified theory of rights that had characterized the Lochner era left it bereft of
a principled basis for determining when governmental acquiescence in
private conduct gave rise to state action.295 His effort to make sense of the
contemporary state action decisions entails seizing on substantive theories of
particular rights where the Court has identified them.296 Normatively,
ideological critics contend that the state action doctrine serves improperly to
protect powerful nongovernmental institutions from substantively valid
claims of rights violations.297
Abandoning the formal state action inquiry for a focus on the substance
of rights does not mean, however, that every offense against a
constitutionally ingrained interest is unconstitutional.298 Rather, that shift
allows us to advance to the functional concern that the state action doctrine
clumsily tries to address: Under what circumstances should courts treat an
offense against constitutional interests as constitutionally unlawful?299 Most
scholars respond that, at a minimum, the state does not act unconstitutionally
when it facilitates a violation of one person’s constitutional interest in the
name of another’s superior interest in privacy or autonomy.300 The familiar
295

See TRIBE, supra note 279, at 1697.
See id. at 1714-15 (criticizing Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), for insufficient attention to substantive conception of rights at issue); see also Brest,
supra note 201, at 1302 (stating that legal positivism requires “a substantive, normative
theory of rights” to sustain public-private distinction); Tushnet, supra note 205, at 383
(contending that “there can be no doctrine of state action that is independent of the
applicable substantive constitutional law.”).
297 Numerous other commentators have called for replacing the conventional state
action doctrine with a focus on substantive rights. See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra
note 194, at 550-51 (advocating abolition of state action doctrine in favor of rights focus);
Horowitz, supra note 226, at 221 (proposing inquiry focused on the relationship among state
authority, the nongovernmental violation of rights, and the degree of the deprivation of
rights); Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 191, at 7-8 (criticizing state action doctrine
because “it directs attention to formal questions instead of the real interests which compete
for constitutional recognition” and outlining interests court should take into account).
298 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 506 (noting that, even in absence
of state action doctrine, nongovernmental actors may be able to justify their behavior in
ways government cannot).
299 One obvious class of private violations of rights that could not give rise to
constitutional liability even absent the state action doctrine are those for which the law
provides an adequate remedy. See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 551-52
(explaining that presence of legal remedies would prevent most ordinary crimes and torts
from becoming constitutionally actionable); Tushnet, supra note 205, at 395-96 (stating that
putatively unreasonable search by private detective would not be a constitutional violation
if state law made the search unlawful).
300 See Black, supra note 199, at 101 (advocating “the limitation of the fourteenth
amendment when it collides with another constitutional guarantee”); Brest, supra note 201,
at 1323 (explaining persistence of state action doctrine in terms of “our psychological and
ideological need to believe that there are essentially private realms . . . in which actions are
autonomous”); Henkin, supra note 228, at 487 (discussing “exceptional category” of equal
protection cases in which “there exist, against the claim of equality, important
296
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hypothetical is that of the racist dinner host. If every action is state action,
may a court compel me to invite an African American to dinner at my home
if I hate African Americans? The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee
compels courts to prevent exclusions based on race; at the same time, the
Constitution’s due process guarantee establishes a zone of privacy in the
home. Enjoining the racist dinner host is out of bounds, not because his
action is not “state action” – the law of trespass necessarily underwrites the
power to exclude people from one’s home – but because a superior
constitutional value is at stake.301 On this basis, critics of the public-private
distinction usually conclude that courts should abandon the distinction in
favor of directly balancing competing constitutional interests.302
At this point, however, a problem arises. What makes the racist
dinner host’s due process interest superior to the excluded guest’s equal
protection interest? Couldn’t the same argument effectively subordinate
any equal protection claim to a defendant’s asserted “privacy” interest in,
for example, refusing to serve or hire African Americans? Insulating
certain decisions from constitutional accountability simply because of
their “private” character seems to entail devolution to the formalism of
the state action doctrine.303 As a practical matter, this problem far
countervailing rights of liberty and privacy that enjoy substantial constitutional
protection”). One consequence of this view is that nongovernmental defendants can assert
against constitutional claims certain interests that are not available to the government. See
Alexander, supra note 278, at 365 “To say . . . that the realm of the private is defined and
buttressed by law . . . is not to say that private choices within it are held to the same
standards as the Constitution imposes on, say, the state police or a welfare department.”);
Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 537-38 (noting that, even absent state action
doctrine, personal liberty interests often would shield nongovernmental actors from liability
where similar action by government would be unconstitutional).
301 Variations on this analysis of the hypothetical appear in Chemerinsky, Rethinking,
supra note 194, at 538; Hale, supra note 237, at 629-30; Henkin, supra note 228, at 770;
Williams, supra note 226, at 368.
302 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 538-39 (calling for abandonment of
state action doctrine in favor of balancing approach); Henkin, supra note 228, at 488
(maintaining that balancing of equality interests against liberty and property interests is
unavoidable); Williams, supra note 226, at 389-90 (urging focus on “the merits of
accommodating the interests” rather than “the nature of a formula which is irrelevant to
the interests involved”). One analysis in the mid-1970s argued that the Court actually was
using a balancing analysis in the guise of the state action doctrine. See Glennon & Nowak,
supra note 233, at 227.
303 Professor Tushnet expresses a concern that, absent a public-private distinction in
constitutional law, judges will tend to identify and elevate privacy rights to defeat novel
equality claims out of reluctance to disturb the status quo. See Tushnet, supra note 205, at
406 (arguing that “the collapse of the [state action] doctrine into substantive constitutional
law forces the courts between doing everything and doing nothing”) (footnote omitted). A
reason not to take Tushnet’s concern so seriously as to perpetuate the present role of the
public-private distinction in constitutional law is that courts frequently use the state action
doctrine to do exactly what Tushnet warns against. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (labeling parade organizers who sought to
exclude gay marchers as private actors while effectively treating putative gay marchers as
state actors because they invoked state antidiscrimination law). A variation on Tushnet’s
concern is that eliding the state action doctrine, by broadening the Constitution’s coverage,
would result in watered down constitutional protections. See Garvey, supra note 214, at
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outstrips the wildly hypothetical notion that anyone would invoke judicial
power to invade someone else’s dining room.304
Louis Henkin’s 40-year old consideration of the problem provides the
essence of a solution. Henkin maintains that “a small area of liberty [is]
favored by the Constitution even over claims to equality.”305 He would
have courts balance competing rights depending on the extent to which
the defendant’s discrimination touches community affairs. Thus, a court
should enforce the theoretical claim of the racist dinner host because his
interest is entirely insular.306 In contrast, the court should not allow a
shopkeeper to discriminate based on race, because such discrimination “is
public, blatant, and widespread; the inequality and indignity therefore
notorious and extensive, with important communal consequences” and
“the relationship of owner to prospective clients and that of customers
with each other are superficial, not intimate.”307
A practical distinction between insular and communal decisions
corresponds to the descriptive difference between natural persons and
institutions. Accordingly, courts should treat natural persons – not every
legal entity that populates an abstract private sphere – as the locus of
constitutional rights adjudication. Emphasis on the rights of natural persons
is a familiar element in liberal theories of rights.308 Although the concept of
the “natural person” presents its own conceptual problems, it effectively
delin
e ates the intimate interests, preferences, and relationships that every
individual in a democratic system should be entitled to control for herself.
314-15 (discussing role of state action doctrine in preserving Constitution’s “economy of
restraint”); Marshall, supra note 196, at 567 (“The more broadly rights are drawn, the more
difficult it becomes to enforce those rights stringently.”). Whatever the merits of that
objection, the substantive approach this Article takes to First Amendment theory defuses it
by advocating a narrower substantive scope for expressive freedom under the First
Amendment. See supra section I.A.2. (describing public rights theory of expressive
freedom).
304 See Black, supra note 199, at 101 (“No suit is of record in which the prayer was for a
mandatory injunction that a dinner invitation issue.”).
305 Henkin, supra note 228, at 496.
306 See id. at 498.
307 Id. at 499; see also Black, supra note 199, at 101 (contending that privacy interests
should not bar constitutional claims “where the problem is in the public life of the
community”).
308 Martha Nussbaum has emphasized “the separateness of persons” as an essential
component of liberal theory. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 62 (2000).
She explains this concept as reflecting
the basic fact that each person has a course from birth to death that is
not precisely the same as that of any other person; that each person is
one and not more than one, that each feels pain in his or her own body,
that the food given to A does not arrive in the stomach of B.
Id.; see also JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 at 131
(1993) (“Our sense of what it is to have and exercise freedom is bound up with our
conception of ourselves as persons and of our relation to value, other people, society and the
causal order of the world.”).
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First, only natural persons should enjoy presumptive immunity from
constitutional obligations. Courts should not, as the state action doctrine
directs, afford every nongovernmental institution a presumptive license to
violate constitutional rights. Rather, they should extend that license only to
natural persons, leaving nongovernmental institutions presumptively subject
to constitutional obligations. Courts may, and no doubt should, grant various
nongovernmental institutions, in particular circumstances, freedom to
disregard constitutional norms.309 Such determinations, however, should
require specific reasons, not the mere imprimatur of “the private.”
Second, and closely related, only natural persons should presumptively
enjoy constitutional rights. Commentators frequently assert that the
conventional public-private distinction is necessary to make a system of
rights coherent, because the idea of the private is necessary for distinguishing
rights-holders from the government.310 The reach of that assertion, however,
exceeds its grasp. A coherent system of rights requires courts only to
distinguish natural persons from institutions.311 As in the matter of
immunities, courts may extend rights to various institutions, but only for
particular reasons, as where institutional rights are instrumentally necessary
to effectuate the rights of natural persons.
Understanding the role of personal integrity in securing any given
constitutional right requires a substantive theory of the right at issue. The
concept of personal integrity has obvious salience for some areas of
constitutional protection, such as rights of privacy. Less obvious, but equally
important, is the significance of personal integrity for the public rights theory
of expressive freedom. This article now returns to the First Amendment and
considers how the foregoing analysis of the public-private distinction should
lead courts to address nongovernmental suppression of wartime political
debate and dissent.

309 I discuss this proviso in the First Amendment context infra notes 330-35 and
accompanying text.
310 Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403; see also Seidman, supra note 197, at 393 (“All
substantive rights rest on the assumption that we can define a sphere of private conduct not
attributable to the state.”); Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 191, at 7 (“[W]hile the search
for a merely formal connection – for ‘state action’ – is misleading, the search for the values
which stand behind the state action limitation is indispensable.”).
311 Professor Schwarzschild, in my view, errs when he insists on “a principle” to justify
our intuitions about this close form of privacy. Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 135-36.
The determination is necessarily normative. Thus, Henkin incisively notes that “we are
invoking ‘substantive due process’ – or something quite like it – to form an exception or a
reasonable classification under the equal protection clause.” Henkin, supra note 228, at
504. That analysis becomes even more interesting in light of the Court’s subsequent,
normatively charged revival of substantive due process to protect the very sort of privacy
interest Henkin describes. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking
down state prohibition on “sodomy” as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
due process principle).
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III.APPLYING THE PUBLIC RIGHTS FIRST
AMENDMENT TO NONGOVERNMENTAL
CENSORSHIP OF WARTIME POLITICAL DEBATE
This part considers how a public rights account of the First
Amendment should accommodate the public-private distinction in the
particular context of nongovernmental constraints on wartime political
debate and dissent. The first section articulates general principles for
invoking the First Amendment to enjoin nongovernmental suppression of
political speech. If, as the public rights theory maintains, the First
Amendment exists to guarantee the robust exchange of ideas necessary
for self-government, then our habit of shielding “private” actions from
First Amendment constraints must yield where those actions seriously
compromise political debate. At the same time, individuals must
maintain sufficient autonomy to process information, formulate positions
about political matters, and assess alternative viewpoints.
The second section applies the principles of the first in the specific
context of nongovernmental suppression of wartime debate. It contends
that courts should apply the First Amendment to enjoin many
nongovernmental constraints on political speech in times of war and
national emergency. The extreme value and vulnerability of robust
political debate in wartime312 makes this an important testing ground for
my thesis. The third section addresses some concerns about assigning
federal courts the duty to remedy nongovernmental constraints on
expression.
A.The Role of Personal Integrity in Applying the Public
Rights First Amendment
The public rights theory of expressive freedom has a complicated
relationship with the public-private distinction. On one hand, the public
rights theory gives the processes of government central importance.
Meiklejohn accords First Amendment protection only to “the freedom of
public discussion,”313 limiting individuals’ “private right of speech” to the
procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment.314 My own terms for
democracy-based and autonomy-based approaches to the First
312 See supra Part I. The task of distinguishing times of war and national emergency
requires a functional inquiry. In general, courts will have to determine whether the
importance and vulnerability of political speech in particular circumstances warrants
enforcing the First Amendment against nongovernmental actors.
313 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 37.
314 Id.
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Amendment – “public rights” and “private rights” – echo the publicprivate distinction. On the other hand, the public rights theory recognizes
a convergence between the public and private spheres.315 Because the
theory emphasizes a substantive bottom line of democratic discourse, it
recognizes the danger nongovernmental power can pose for expressive
freedom316 and trusts government in some circumstances to advance
expressive freedom.317 At a deeper level, the rigid public-private
distinction’s reification of atomistic individualism is antithetical to the
public rights theory’s emphasis on the public interest as the object of
political deliberation.318
The challenge that the idea of the private poses for the public rights
theory animates Meiklejohn’s treatment of art and literature. By limiting
the First Amendment’s protection to political speech, he consigns
“private” categories of speech to the procedural protections of the Due
Process Clause.319 At the same time, Meiklejohn acknowledges that art
and literature – which in a sense are quintessentially private forms of
expression – can exert powerful influences over people’s decisions about
how to approach political issues. Accordingly, the First Amendment
must protect art for the same reasons it protects facially political speech:
so that citizens have access to the full range of inputs that enhance their
wisdom as self-governors.320 Although the public rights theory disdains
the pride of place that the private rights theory accords to individual
autonomy, Meiklejohn’s treatment of art affirms that no community can
exist, let alone govern itself, without the conscientious independence of
the individuals who constitute it. Likewise, the category of “political
315 See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1985-87 (describing public-private convergence
under public rights theory).
316 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 247, at 1641 (“The reality is that
when private institutions prohibit and punish expression there is a loss of speech, just as
when the government prohibits and punishes expression.”).
317 See, e.g., Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 64, at 783 (contending that “the first
amendment . . . points toward the necessity of the activist state”); Sunstein, Free Speech,
supra note 65, at 288-89 (advocating government action to ensure that broadcast media
advance First Amendment values). Both Fiss and Sunstein forswear any direct attack on
the public-private distinction. See Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 64, at 1414 (“Nothing I
have said is meant to destroy the distinction presupposed by classical liberalism between
state and citizen, or between the public and private.”); Sunstein, supra, at 267 (maintaining
“that the First Amendment is aimed only at governmental action, and that private conduct
raises no constitutional question”). Each, however, advocates doctrinal shifts that would
require courts to rethink the uses of the distinction in constitutional law. See supra notes
64-70 and accompanying text.
318 Compare Hor[]witz, Public-Private, supra note 201, at 1427 (tying vitality of publicprivate distinction to widespread rejection of the notion of a substantive public interest)
(hereinafter) with Magarian, supra note 9, at 1980-82 (discussing central importance of
substantive public interest in public rights theory of expressive freedom).
319 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 79-80.
320 See id. at 117 (noting value of art and literature for political deliberation); Sunstein,
Free Speech, supra note 65, at 304 (acknowledging political content of some art and
literature).
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issues” expands with our understanding that institutions outside
government often make decisions that broadly affect the political
community and thus become proper, even necessary, objects of
democratic discourse.
The public rights theory’s emphasis on deliberative democracy makes
the concept of personal integrity essential for expressive freedom. In
order for the First Amendment to ensure robust democratic discourse, it
must respect a zone of individual conscience that allows people to
evaluate information, formulate ideas, and participate meaningfully in
democratic processes. This conception of personal integrity embodies a
functional corollary to the public rights theory’s recognition of a publicprivate convergence. The public-private distinction should inform First
Amendment analysis only to the extent the distinction serves the core
First Amendment value of participatory democracy. Respecting a zone of
individual conscience shields members of the political community from
any conceivable First Amendment liability while also identifying them as
First Amendment rights-holders.321 The essential role of individual
conscience in collective self-government is what puts the “rights” in the
public rights First Amendment. The importance of allowing individuals
to exercise their conscientious faculties in political processes precludes
any First Amendment check on their treatment of others’ speech.
In contrast, nongovernmental institutions are not members of the
political community, nor do they possess the similar sort of individual
privacy interest, predicated on the Due Process Clause, that can properly
fend off constitutional claims in general.322 In fact, the economic power
of many nongovernmental institutions makes them significant threats to
public rights of expressive freedom,323 a fact that justifies courts in
enjoining nongovernmental interference with political debate.324 That
same economic power can transform institutions’ First Amendment
claims into weapons against government reforms designed to enrich and
broaden political debate.325 As I discuss below, many nongovernmental
321 See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
Under the public rights theory,
nonmembers of the political community may be appropriate First Amendment claimants, to
the extent their contributions to political dialogue advance deliberative democracy. See
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 118-19 (discussing expressive freedom of noncitizens).
322 See supra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
323 Commentators in the public rights tradition since Meiklejohn have recognized
threats to political expression, whether from governmental or nongovernmental sources,
primarily in the allocation of expressive opportunities but have had less occasion to
emphasize censorship of political debate. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
324 For a discussion of the necessity of direct injunctions against nongovernmental
actors, see infra notes 440-43 and accompanying text.
325 See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (upholding
corporations’ challenge to state’s ban on corporate contributions or expenditures in
initiative or referendum campaigns).
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institutions make sufficiently important contributions to democratic
discourse to warrant protecting their expressive autonomy.326
Determining when to extend such protection, however, requires a
nuanced functional analysis – not merely a reflex to slap the label
“private” on any institution outside government.
Removing the public-private distinction’s automatic protection of
nongovernmental censors would outrage defenders of the rigid publicprivate distinction in First Amendment law, who condemn any notion of
exposing nongovernmental institutions to First Amendment liability.327
Their objections would rest on two premises. The first premise – that the
First Amendment does nothing more or less than protect the speech of all
nongovernmental entities, great and small, from governmental
interference – clashes with the public rights theory’s fundamental
commitment to a positive role for the First Amendment in promoting
democratic discourse.328
The second premise for shielding nongovernmental institutions from
First Amendment obligations is that government presents the only
constitutionally cognizable threat to freedom because government enjoys
a monopoly on the use of force.329 Government does enjoy unique power
to wage war, a power whose distinctive importance for the common
welfare animates this article’s argument. Short of war, however,
government’s ability to use force is less distinctive.330
Certain
constitutional rights, notably those related to criminal procedure, may
matter only in light of government’s unique attributes, but those attributes
have only limited relevance for the capacity to suppress speech. An
employer that fires an employee for speaking, a shopping mall that
excludes political protestors, or a broadcaster that buries a story critical
of government policy does not need the threat of force. It only needs the
326

See infra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
328 Actually, the private rights theory may result in greater free speech protection for
powerful institutional speakers than for individuals. See Magarian, supra note 9, at 195556.
329 See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 93, at 538-39 (emphasizing government’s “unique . . .
capacity to employ legitimized violence” as basis for public-private distinction in First
Amendment context); see also supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text (discussing
nongovernmental institutions’ coercive capacity).
330 Numerous corporations and other nongovernmental authorities employ armed
security personnel. True, those authorities require governmental permission before they
can use force. But that fact – even if we ignore private authorities’ practical capacity to use
force illegally – merely underscores the government’s ability to distribute the power to use
force to private authorities. Through lobbying, private authorities can cash in their
economic power for authority to use force. Moreover, divisions of governing power under
our constitutional scheme belie the vision of a monolithic, Hobbseian “state.” Most First
Amendment claims target actions of state and local governments. Local governments
employ force only on the authority of state governments, and state governments’ use of force
under their police powers is subject to federal judicial oversight, congressional preemption,
and superior federal military power. Thus, most “state” First Amendment defendants enjoy
no greater independence in the use of force than nongovernmental authorities do.
327
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authority that it maintains a prerogative to exercise over its employees,
patrons, or reporters.
Good reasons exist for taking governments very seriously as dangers
to expressive freedom. They exercise substantial control over people’s
lives. They employ enormous bureaucracies that often display no
sensitivity to expressive rights and can suppress expression without any
one person’s having to bear the legal and psychological burdens of
responsibility. Their interests frequently create significant incentives to
censor speech. Each of these statements, however, also describes private
authorities in many situations.
Moreover, from a constitutional
standpoint, private authorities carry the extra risk factor of immunity
from direct political control.
Thus, judicial distinctions between
governmental and nongovernmental authorities as threats to expressive
freedom should be matters of degree and nuance, not of categorical
certainty.331
Discarding the categorical distinction between governmental and
nongovernmental authorities in First Amendment adjudication means that
courts must articulate a reason, beyond the formal public-private
distinction, for shielding any given nongovernmental institution from
First Amendment liability or for allowing such an institution to raise First
Amendment claims. The principal possibility, applicable in cases that
present conflicting First Amendment claims,332 is that a nongovernmental
institution, by virtue of its distinctive characteristics, may make important
contributions to democratic discourse that justify protection for its
expressive conduct, including arguably expressive decisions to censor
speech.333 Serious doubt exists whether some types of nongovernmental
authorities – notably business corporations – contribute to democratic
discourse in a manner that justifies broad First Amendment protection of
their expressive activities.334
Other nongovernmental institutions,
331

For a nuanced discussion, rooted in an autonomy-centered First Amendment theory,
about the difficulties of counterbalancing governmental and nongovernmental threats to
expressive freedom, see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (hereinafter Strauss, Persuasion).
332 A prominent descriptive insight of the public rights theory is that expressive
freedom controversies often involve conflicting claims of speech rights. See Magarian, supra
note 9, at 1986-87; see also R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as
Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335 (2001) (examining some implications of opposing
free speech interests in First Amendment cases). Restricting a nongovernmental entity’s
ability to censor speech often entails, at least from the private entity’s standpoint, limiting
the entity’s own supposed expressive rights.
333 Value for individuals’ understanding of political issues likewise provides the only
basis on which an institution, as distinct from an individual, can raise a First Amendment
claim under the public rights theory.
334 Development of this point requires a more thorough assessment, under the public
rights theory, of the idea that the First Amendment should protect corporations’ expressive
freedom. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 478 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (positing
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however, play valuable roles in maintaining robust democratic discourse,
either as political associations of individuals335 or because they perform
functions that promote political debate.336 Courts need to consider a
given institution’s contributions to expressive freedom in assessing its
claims for First Amendment protection or insulation from First
Amendment obligations.337
A thorough assessment of how courts should decide whether and
when to accord particular nongovernmental institutions First Amendment
protections or immunities from First Amendment liability lies beyond the
scope of this article. Courts would need to develop a body of doctrine
that assessed nongovernmental institutions’ First Amendment-styled
claims and defenses in light of the public rights theory of expressive
freedom. My goal in this section has been to establish that the public
rights theory requires a protected sphere of personal conscience and
justifies substantial limits on the prerogatives of institutions to constrain
political speech. The next section turns to a particular context in which
those principles compel imposition of First Amendment liability on
nongovernmental institutions: suppression or censorship of wartime
political debate.
B.Enjoining Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime
Political Debate
According to the public rights theory of expressive freedom, robust
political debate is essential in a democratic society for wise
policymaking, and the value of debate is greatest when the stakes of

necessity of corporate free speech for an informed electorate).
335 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (recognizing importance
of associations’ advocacy role for public discourse).
336 The First Amendment’s Press Clause provides strong textual support for the
intuition that the news media fall into this category. See U.S. CONST. Amend. I, cl. 4. For a
discussion of how the First Amendment should affect news media failures to facilitate
political debate, see supra section III.B.3. The category of nongovernmental institutions
that promote debate also would encompass publishers, insulating from First Amendment
objections some of their economically motivated decisions to delay or not to publish
particular works. Similarly, universities’ and libraries’ contributions to democratic
discourse would justify sparing them many First Amendment obligations.
337 Circumstances might conceivably arise in which a court could properly hold some
nonspeech interest of a nongovernmental defendant to outweigh a First Amendment
plaintiff’s expressive interest. In general, however, the public rights theory’s narrow focus
on political expression obviates the need for the sort of balancing common in present First
Amendment adjudication. See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1987-88 (explaining preference
for categorical methodology under public rights theory). Thus, if a challenged action has
encroached on the First Amendment core of political speech, the defendant’s countervailing
nonspeech interest should carry little weight. My suggestions in the following discussion
that the Court adapt balancing analyses to evaluate certain instances of nongovernmental
censorship reflect both the practical utility of adopting existing tests and a high degree of
caution in making sweeping changes to existing doctrine.
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338

policy decisions are highest.
Given that value, and this article’s
analysis of the public-private distinction in constitutional law, the First
Amendment
should
provide
substantial
protection
against
nongovernmental censorship or suppression of political debate in times of
war and national emergency.
As discussed in detail above,
nongovernmental action against many and varied challenges to
government policies and conventional wisdom has undermined political
debate since the September 11 terrorist attacks. This section sets forth
the specific implications of extending the First Amendment to the three
categories of nongovernmental action catalogued in that discussion:
exclusions of political speakers from privately owned public spaces,
reprisals against political expression, and suppression of information by
the news media.
1. Exclusions of Political Speakers from Privately Owned
Public Spaces
Political speakers who find themselves barred in times of war and
national emergency from property generally open to the public should be
able to secure First Amendment injunctions to enable their expression.339
A sensible analysis would resemble the familiar public forum doctrine,
which applies to exclusions of speakers from government-owned spaces.
Under that doctrine, the government generally may limit expressive
activity on property that serves a function unrelated to expression, such as
a prison or military base.340 In contrast, content-based limits on speech in
spaces generally open to expressive activity, such as public sidewalks and
government buildings available for public use, are subject to strict
scrutiny.341 More deferential scrutiny applies to content-neutral limits on
expression, including regulations of conduct that incidentally affect
speech342 and regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression.343
Finally, where the government has opened its property to expressive
activity for a limited purpose, it enjoys substantial latitude to proscribe
338

See supra section I.A.2.
See supra section I.B.2.
340 See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespass convictions of
students who occupied county jail); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding
regulations that restricted political activity on army base).
341 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down under Free Speech
Clause state university’s denial to religious student group of right to use generally available
meeting space).
342 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to federal ban on burning draft cards).
343 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge, brought by activists who sought to dramatize plight
of homeless, to federal ban on sleeping in certain public parks).
339
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speech outside the forum’s purpose, but it must forego content-based
regulation of speech that serves that purpose.344 Courts could easily adapt
the public forum doctrine to nongovernmental exclusions of expressive
activity.345 Such an analysis would respect property interests that are
genuinely incompatible with expressive activity: a company would not
have to allow a protest march through its offices. At the same time, the
analysis would facilitate expressive activity that uses property generally
open to the public.
An analysis derived from the public forum doctrine would have
altered the results of two important Vietnam-era cases with striking
similarities to present circumstances. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,346 the
Court rejected a First Amendment challenge by antiwar protesters
threatened with arrest for leafleting in an urban shopping mall. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, had to confront the Court’s decision four
years earlier in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc.347 that a suburban shopping center could not bar union
organizers from picketing on shopping center property.
Justice
Marshall’s majority opinion in Logan Valley had emphasized that a
shopping center served the functions of a municipal business district and
was open to the public for commercial activity.348 His opinion had relied
on a vision of expressive freedom consistent with the public rights theory:
The large-scale movement of this country’s
population from the cities to the suburbs has been
accompanied by the advent of the suburban shopping
center. . . . Business enterprises located in downtown
areas would be subject to on-the-spot public criticism for
their [controversial] practices, but businesses situated in
the suburbs could largely immunize themselves from
similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire of parking
lots around their stores. Neither precedent nor policy
compels a result so at variance with the goal of free
344 This somewhat elusive “limited purpose” doctrine provides the clearest explanation
for the result in U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981), in which the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Postal Service’s
restriction on depositing unstamped mail in home letter boxes, reasoning that letter boxes
were openly available only for the deposit of paid mail.
345 By utilizing the public forum doctrine as the most readily available device for
curbing nongovernmental denials of access to speakers, I do not mean to dismiss cogent
objections that the doctrine is an unduly formalistic analytic tool that overshadows conflicts
between competing principles in First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John
E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224 (1984) (contending that public forum
analysis “distracts attention from the first amendment values at stake in a given case”).
346 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
347 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
348 See id. at 320-21 (discussing government’s various prerogatives for limiting speech
on public property and stating that private property owners’ rights “are at the very least coextensive with the powers possessed by States and municipalities”).
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expression and communication that is the heart of the
First Amendment.349
The Lloyd Corp. opinion limited Logan Valley to its facts. The majority
insisted that “property [does not] lose its private character merely because
the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.”350 A
First Amendment right to protest in privately owned business districts
would constitute a “doctrine of dedication of private property to public
use.”351 Justice Powell saw no conflict between expressive freedom and
this aggressive defense of property interests.352 He offered nothing to
refute the First Amendment theory at the heart of Logan Valley.353
Under the analysis of this article, the Court probably decided Logan
Valley correctly and certainly erred in the wartime context of Lloyd Corp.
As Justice Marshall recognized in Logan Valley, a shopping center is a
space designed to foster public interaction and communication. Although
shopping centers exist for commercial purposes, the variety and number
of interactions they promote gives rise to an expectation that all manner
of communications will occur. Because shopping centers and malls
crowd out the public streets and sidewalks that once served as centers of
interpersonal engagement, allowing their owners to proscribe political
speech would drastically limit expressive freedom. Where self-governing
people confront the question whether to start or continue a war, such a
limitation severely undermines the public interest. Accordingly, Stephen
Downs should have been able to wear his antiwar t-shirt around the
Crossgates Mall354 secure in the First Amendment’s protection. Political
protestors should be free to speak in the concourses of shopping malls
349

Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569.
351 Id.
352 See id. at 570:
The Framers of the Constitution certainly did not think these
fundamental rights of a free society are [sic] incompatible with each
other. There may be situations where accommodations between them,
and the drawing of lines to assure due protection of both, are not easy.
But on the facts presented in this case, the answer is clear.
353 The Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), abandoned the pretense of
accommodation in Lloyd Corp. and overruled Logan Valley altogether. See Hudgens, 424
U.S. at 520-21. The Court’s method of dispensing with Logan Valley did little credit to any
of the principals. Justice Marshall, author of Logan Valley, insisted at length in his Lloyd
Corp. dissent that the two cases could not be distinguished, see Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at
577-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting), then declared in dissent in Hudgens that they could be.
See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, after maintaining
in his Lloyd Corp. majority opinion that the case was indistinguishable from Logan Valley,
conveniently conceded error in his Hudgens concurrence. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 523-24
& n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, having joined Justice Marshall’s majority in
Logan Valley and dissent in Lloyd Corp., had to deliver the majority opinion in Hudgens, a
role for which he all but apologized. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518.
354 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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and should have recourse to the courts if mall owners try to stop them.
Mall owners, consistent with the public forum doctrine, should have some
latitude to regulate the time, place, and manner of expression. They
should not, however, have authority to sever their lucrative commerce
with the public from the political discourse that naturally accompanies
that commerce.
In a second Vietnam-era case, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee,355 an antiwar group and the DNC brought a First Amendment
challenge against broadcasters’ refusal to sell advertising time for
political messages. As in the shopping center cases, the challengers
contended that the Constitution compelled private property owners to
allow political speakers access to property the owners had opened to
expressive activity. As in Lloyd Corp., the Court rebuffed the challenge,
with a plurality concluding that the First Amendment created no general
right of access to the mass media. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion
characterized the broadcasters’ policy against running editorial messages
as “expressly based on a journalistic judgment that 10- to 60-second spot
announcements are ill-suited to intelligible and intelligent treatment of
public issues.”356 He acknowledged the public trust of broadcast
licensees but concluded that Congress had given licensees primary
responsibility for determining how to effectuate that trust.357 He
subordinated the challengers’ First Amendment claim to the broadcasters’
autonomy interest:
[I]t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of
promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression,
that the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees
are subject to the kind of restraints urged by respondents.
To do so in the name of the First Amendment would be a
contradiction.358
Justice Brennan, dissenting, raised traditional state action arguments
against the plurality’s analysis. Broadcasters, he pointed out, require a
publicly owned resource – the airwaves – in order to do business.359 They
depend on the government for their right to use that resource, and the
government subjects them to extensive regulatory control.360
This article’s analysis of the First Amendment and the public-private
distinction precludes the plurality’s reasoning and result in CBS v. DNC.
When the nation is wrestling with questions of war and peace, the First
Amendment cannot countenance broadcast licensees’ active efforts to
prevent political views from circulating. The plurality’s analysis of
355

412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Id. at 118 (plurality opinion).
357 See id. at 117.
358 Id. at 120-21.
359 See id. at 173-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
360 See id. at 175-78.
356
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broadcasters’ editorial discretion is correct but beside the point. The
media’s editorial discretion properly enjoys formidable First Amendment
protection,361 but it does not suffer when a broadcaster has made
advertising time available and someone with a political message seeks to
purchase it.362 As in the shopping center cases, the Justices who
advocated public access gave the game away by playing on the field of
conventional state action reasoning.
Whether or not national
broadcasters’ privileges as licensees should mark them formally as “state
actors,” they control which political ideas reach massive numbers of
people. Broadcasters’ refusals to accept advertising revenue from
activists with varied viewpoints on the impending war with Iraq363 were
the costly legacy of CBS v. DNC. Under a better understanding of the
First Amendment, those activists, rebuffed by CNN or CBS, should have
had no trouble securing injunctions to compel acceptance of their political
messages on the same terms as other paid advertisements. Broadcasters
are free to determine how much advertising time they sell and what they
charge for it, but they should not have latitude to engineer a contentbased exclusion of political expression.
Some might object that a constitutional allowance for political
speakers to use nongovernmental property would violate the First
Amendment rights of property owners to be free from “compelled
speech” because it would force the owners to present messages with
which they disagreed.364 The argument has both practical and theoretical
deficiencies. On a practical level, most people neither know nor care who
owns their favorite shopping center or television station. The idea that
shoppers or viewers would ascribe to those unknown owners any
protestor’s political message, let alone the multiplicity of competing and
contradictory messages that a constitutional allowance for public access
would produce, defies imagination. On the level of the public rights
theory, the public’s interest in information and open debate dwarfs
property owners’ autonomy interests, including their interest in avoiding
association with ideas they disdain.365 Another potential objection is that,
assuming the Court incorrectly decided Lloyd Corp. and CBS v. DNC, it
361

See infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text
This was the interest that troubled the Court in CBS v. DNC. See 412 U.S. at 124
(declining to require broadcasters to accept political advertising because such a requirement
would cause “a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the coverage
of public issues”).
363 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
364 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down on compelled
speech grounds New Hampshire requirement that motorists display “Live Free or Die”
slogan on license plates).
365 See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1982 (discussing public rights theory’s elevation of
collective informational interests over individual autonomy interests).
362
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could correct those errors simply by holding mall owners and
broadcasters to be state actors. That approach, in my view, would
underscore the shallow formalism of the state action doctrine while
ignoring the important reason for overturning the precedents: the
necessity, in a healthy democratic system, of robust political discourse.
2. Reprisals Against Political Expression
The public rights theory dictates that, as in cases where property
owners exclude political speakers from areas generally open to the public,
courts should invoke the First Amendment to enjoin reprisals by private
authorities against individuals’ expression of their political views.366
Courts should not allow majoritarian pique, which may reflect covert or
implicit government pressure, to justify institutional retaliation against
socially beneficial speech. Actions that properly subject individuals to
reprisals, such as failures to perform job duties, may in some cases
involve political expression. Institutional retaliation aimed at the
political content of speech, however, is rarely if ever justified.
Nongovernmental institutions’ participation in political debates may often
enrich the public’s understanding of important issues. In contrast, courts
should not tolerate those institutions’ leveraging their resources to silence
public debate, any more than courts tolerate censorship by the
government.
Here, as in the context of access to property, a doctrine applied to
date only against government defendants provides a blueprint for analysis
of claims against nongovernmental authorities. In Pickering v. Board of
Education,367 the Court held that, although the public interest in efficient
services empowers the government to place greater constraints on
employees’ speech than it may place on citizens generally, it must
exercise substantial restraint in disciplining employees for speaking about
“matters of public concern.”368 A public employer may justify a
restriction on such speech only by showing that the “necessary impact on
the [employer’s] actual operation” outweighs the employer’s expressive
interest.369 Most Pickering cases involve employees’ criticisms of their
employers, and the Court occasionally has upheld employers’ retaliation
against such criticism.370 In contrast, the Court has shown little tolerance
366

See supra section I.B.3.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
368 Id. at 568.
369 Id. at 571.
370 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (upholding employee’s discharge for
complaining about internal office policy); but see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994)
(vacating summary judgment in favor of employer and supervisor who fired employee for
criticizing her department); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (affirming decision
that professor who had criticized college president and regents was entitled to pursue
lawsuit for wrongful termination). The force of the Pickering doctrine’s protection even for
367
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for reprisals against employees’ broader political statements, even
applying Pickering to reverse the firing of a clerk who expressed hope
that someone would assassinate the President.371 From the standpoint of
the public rights theory, the Pickering standard has the virtue of
incorporating the distinction between speech on matters of general and
individual interest.372 The Court in applying Pickering has emphasized
the informational interests of audiences as well as the autonomy interests
of speakers.373
Subjecting nongovernmental employers to a Pickering-type analysis
would have given Dan Guthrie and Tom Gutting, the newspaper
columnists fired for their criticisms of President Bush’s behavior after the
September 11 terrorist attacks,374 strong grounds for First Amendment
challenges to their dismissals. Guthrie’s and Gutting’s accusations of
presidential cowardice in the face of crisis boldly challenged official
conduct and popular sentiment on a matter of the most serious national
concern. Their employers, in arguing for the functional necessity of
firing the columnists, probably would have maintained that the firings
were essential to prevent angry readers from canceling their
subscriptions. This argument would have presented problems of both fact
and principle. On a practical level, the newspapers would have needed to
substantiate claims of potential losses in readership, and the fact that
Grants Pass, Ore. and Texas City, Tex. are not centers of media
competition would have complicated that effort. As a matter of principle,
the First Amendment precludes even weighty arguments for the
instrumental necessity of chilling or punishing speech.375 The newspaper
owners’ angry published responses to their columnists, besides probably
placating most offended readers, reflected the positive instinct to rebut

employees who directly criticize their employers becomes apparent through a contrast with
similar cases involving nongovernmental employers, in which lower courts have
consistently refused to find First Amendment violations. See Robert F. Ladenson, Free
Speech in the Workplace and the Public-Private Distinction, 7 LAW & PHIL. 247, 252 & n.22
(1989) (cataloguing decisions).
371 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). The Pickering doctrine, like any
legal constraint on employers’ reasons for taking job-related actions, has relevance
primarily for dismissals or disciplinary actions against existing employees, although a
Pickering-based claim for failure to hire a job applicant based on her speech would
presumably be possible given sufficient evidence.
372 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (holding that Pickering test does not apply when
employees speak “upon matters only of personal interest”).
373 See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468
(1995) (considering “the interests of both potential audiences and . . . present and future
employees” in employees’ ability to accept honoraria for speaking).
374 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
375 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (rejecting interests offered in
support of criminal prosecution for burning of American flag).

68
arguments, rather than censor them.376 The firings, unfortunately, recast
the owners’ reasoned responses as mere adjuncts to their superior
economic power.
Extension of the Pickering analysis to
nongovernmental workplaces would largely preclude employer retaliation
as a weapon against political dissenters.377
A roughly similar analysis could apply in retaliation cases outside the
employment context. For example, in considering a legal challenge to the
major stock exchanges’ bar against Al Jazeera journalists because of their
colleagues’ reporting on the Iraq war,378 a court could have inquired
whether the importance of the ban to the exchanges’ operation
outweighed the public’s interest in multifaceted news reporting.379 The
exchanges would have brought even less to that balance than the
newspapers that fired Guthrie and Gutting. The idea that anyone would
have criticized the exchanges, let alone stopped dealing with them, had
they not gone out of their way to suspend Al Jazeera’s floor privileges is
inconceivable. On the other hand, the images of dead and imprisoned
American soldiers whose broadcast prompted the suspensions had
tremendous potential to influence debates about the wisdom of the Iraq
war. The exchanges appear to have used their institutional might to chill
such reporting, and accordingly to diminish public debate, out of nothing
more than offended sensibilities. As in the newspaper firing cases, the
exchanges might have done the public a service by standing up for their
sensibilities and criticizing Al Jazeera’s journalistic standards. In
contrast, their choices to cut their opponent off at the knees offended First
Amendment values in a way that a democratic society at war cannot
afford.
376 Had the newspapers chosen not to publish the offending columns, rather than
punish the authors, courts would have had to defer to their editorial discretion. Reprisals
against columnists for the content of their articles transcends that discretion. I propose an
indirect approach for dealing with news media misinformation and suppression of
information infra section III.B.3.
377 For an argument that legislatures should constrain nongovernmental employers’
retaliation against employees’ speech but the First Amendment should not, see Ladenson,
supra note 368, at 256-61. Ladenson’s opposition to constitutionalizing the problem stems
from his premises that the First Amendment serves primarily to check any institution with
“sufficient power to control thought over an entire society” and that only the government
has such power. Id. at 257. The first premise, in my view, sets too high a standard for First
Amendment concern, and the second underestimates nongovernmental institutions’
capacity to curb expressive freedom.
378 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
379 Although the banned journalists presumably were not American citizens, the public
rights theory’s emphasis on the public’s interest in information dictates that courts extend
full First Amendment protection to noncitizen speakers who address matters of public
importance. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 118-19. The al-Jazeera episode does not
implicate the interesting question whether the daily workings of stock exchanges are
matters of public importance, because the concern in retaliation cases is that a restriction
will chill a speaker’s expression, and al-Jazeera expresses many views on political matters.
Finally, the Internet and satellite television render immaterial the fact that al-Jazeera’s
primary audience is outside the United States.
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3. Misinformation and Suppression of Information by
News Media
The public rights theory of expressive freedom requires strong First
Amendment protection of the news media, because they make an essential
contribution to democratic discourse by gathering information and
disseminating it to the public.380 Accordingly, my proposal to enforce
First Amendment standards against nongovernmental actors must address
news organizations’ failures to report information salient to policy
disputes.381 At the same time, the news media present an especially
thorny problem for that proposal. As the Supreme Court has often noted,
the media’s informational functions involve the constant exercise of
subjective editorial discretion.382 Editors and producers must constantly
determine which stories are newsworthy, what information is sufficiently
reliable, and how to allocate limited publishing resources among different
stories. Any governmental interference with those decisions, including
judicial interference, threatens to undermine values central to the First
Amendment. To say that a judge, in appropriate circumstances, may tell
a property owner what activities it must tolerate or bar an employer from
certain retaliatory actions is one thing. To say that she may tell an editor
which stories to run or not to run is something else entirely. For the same
reason, media entities, unlike nongovernmental institutions generally,
should be able to raise First Amendment claims.383
Even so, the same sorts of pressures that may motivate a mall owner
to exclude protestors or an employer to fire a political dissenter can lead
to situations like news organizations’ voluntary submission to restrictive
380

See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing news media’s public

trust).
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See supra section I.B.1. (discussing media failures since 2001 terrorist attacks).
See Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674
(1998) (recognizing the TV broadcasters have “widest journalistic freedom”); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that publisher’s treatment of
public issues falls within its proper editorial control); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973) (plurality opinion) (recognizing necessity of substantial
journalistic discretion for broadcasters).
383 Although my discussion focuses on the news media, the entertainment media play a
complementary role in fostering political discourse, a role undermined by consolidation of
media ownership. See, e.g., Brent Staples, “The Trouble With Corporate Radio: The Day the
Protest Music Died,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, p. A30 (positing connection between
consolidation of radio station ownership and absence from airwaves of politically
provocative music); see also supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text (discussing
censorship by entertainment corporations since September 11 terrorist attacks). Like the
news media, the entertainment media require editorial freedom to perform their democratic
function; thus, the approach proposed here for First Amendment oversight of news media
ownership rules also encompasses the entertainment media.
382
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rules for battlefield reporting in Iraq384 and their parroting of the
government’s dubious assertions about the extent of the Iraqi military
threat.385 The influence of owners and advertisers can make the media, in
Ed Baker’s sadly apt description, “too timid in exposing corruption and
abuse both of public and especially of private power, insufficiently
diverse in its presentations, relatively unresponsive to significant
elements of society and more encouraging of political passivity than
public involvement.”386 Media corporations in the United States may be
more subject to intimidation by overt or subtle governmental influence
than are state-owned media such as the BBC, because their “private”
status leaves them vulnerable to regulatory rewards and punishments
while preventing the sort of public accountability that state-owned media
must face.387 Pressure on the media intensifies during wartime, when the
government can manipulate media behavior through selective access to
battlefields and strategists and when the public, at least initially, demands
a patriotic informational environment.388 Media capitulation to such
pressures exacts far greater First Amendment costs than suppression of
debate in the private property or reprisal cases, because the media plays a
central role in informing the public and fostering political dialogue.
Even though courts should not interfere in editorial decisions, they
can encourage unfettered newsgathering and reporting by scrutinizing
institutional arrangements that inhibit media competition.389 The present
climate of limited regulation has allowed a few corporations to acquire a
large percentage of key American media outlets. In broadcasting, the five
largest media companies – News Corp., Viacom, Disney, General
384

See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
386 C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMM.
421, 426 (1993); see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, at 60 (contending that “the
preponderance of [corporate journalism] would be compatible with an authoritarian political
regime”).
387 Paul Krugman, The China Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2003, p. A31. Krugman
contends that the primary threat to media independence arises not from direct government
censorship but from “a system in which the major media companies have strong incentives
to present the news in a way that pleases the party in power, and no incentive not to.” Id.
388 According to CBS anchor Dan Rather, discussing coverage of the Iraq war,
diminished journalistic independence results from “fear among journalists – fear that if we
don’t dumb it down, sleaze it up, tart it up, that some competitor will beat us in circulation
and ratings.” Did We See the Real War?, supra note 106, at 44. Harvard media analyst
Marvin Kalb concurred: “There may be serious economic consequences for American
broadcast-news outlets that are inadequately patriotic in appearance.” Id. at 43. Time’s
James Poniewozik, also reflecting on the Iraq war, put the point more bluntly: “Patriotism
pays. So Fox and NBC dueled over who was the greater quisling.” Poniewozik, supra note
118, at 71.
389 See Baker, supra note 384, at 431 (contending that “concern with [media] ownership
discretion is intensified because the structure of the media market routinely places the
interest in profits in tension with journalistic professionalism and democratic service”);
Netanel, Mass Media, supra note 93, at 338 (advocating, to ensure that media serves
democratic interests, “partial solutions, most involving efforts to balance one power center
against one or more others”).
385
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Electric, and AOL Time-Warner – own stations that account for 70
percent of the nation’s prime time television viewership.390 Six cable
television companies boast 80 percent of cable subscribers.391 Clear
Channel, the largest U.S. radio corporation, owns stations that draw 25
percent of all listeners.392 Media consolidation has even affected the
notoriously heterogeneous Internet: 16 large companies own the top 20
news sites on the World Wide Web, but the top five receive more traffic
than the next 15 combined.393 Large media corporations’ influence over
the agencies that regulate the media business394 makes judicial oversight
in this area essential.
Concentration of ownership of major media outlets reduces the
diversity and originality of information the media presents. The massive
consolidation of the radio industry prompted by the 1996
Telecommunications Act395 has led to a reduction in radio newsgathering
operations, with many local reporting staffs gutted.396 Conversely,
diffusion of ownership facilitates a vigorous and inclusive exchange of
information and ideas and ensures that the media present diverse
information and varied perspectives.397 Although government regulation
to prevent concentration of media ownership arguably offends a private
rights vision of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has long held
390 See Jeff Gelles, FCC Quiet on Media-Ownership Vote, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 11,
2003, p. E1; David D. Kirkpatrick, From Some Boardrooms, Nostalgia for Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2003, p. C9 (hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Boardrooms).
391 Kirkpatrick, Boardrooms, supra note 388, at C9.
392 Id. Clear Channel owns over 1,200 radio stations, 37 television stations, and more
than 775,000 billboards and is also the world’s largest concert producer. Andrew Ratner,
War Coverage Could Alter U.S. Media Policy, BALT. SUN, Mar. 30, 2003, p. 1D.
393 Matthew Hindman & Kenneth Neil Cukier, More News, Less Diversity, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2003, p. A17. Despite the Internet’s decentralized technology, established media
titans enjoy advantages in cyberspace, because they can adapt existing content and
advertising relationships to the new medium. See MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94,
at 77-78 (discussing reasons for corporate primacy on Internet).
394 A recent report by the Center for Public Integrity found that, during the past eight
years, broadcast and telecommunications interests provided the primary financial backing
for 2,500 trips, costing $2.8 million, by FCC commissioners and employees. Bob Herbert,
Cozy With the F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, p. A35. The Center also reported that,
during their consideration of the new regulations, FCC officials met more than 70 times
with media industry representatives, compared to five meetings with consumer advocates.
Id.; see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, at 78-79 (documenting influence of
corporate media lobbyists).
395 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
396 See MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, at 53. Prior to the 1996 deregulation,
no single entity could own more than 28 stations nationwide; today, Clear Channel owns
1,200 stations. Id.
397 See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY:
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999); Baker, supra note 384; Jerome A.
Barron, Structural Regulation of the Media and the Diversity Rationale, 52 FED. COMM. L.J.
555 (2002).
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that ownership controls advance important First Amendment values.398
Ownership regulations, while not sufficient in an era of unprecedented
technological change to guarantee robust democratic discourse, remain
necessary for that goal.399 The market alone will not produce a
competitive, diverse media environment.400 Accordingly, federal courts
should emphasize First Amendment interests when evaluating
government regulations that affect the distribution of media ownership.
Some commentators have argued that substantial concentration of
media ownership benefits democracy by ensuring that media entities are
large and powerful enough to function as forceful counterweights to
government. In articulating the idea of a First Amendment defined by the
institutional media’s role in checking government misconduct, Vincent
Blasi asserts “the need for well-organized, well-financed, professional
critics to serve as a counterforce to government.”401 The argument is one
of degree, and my proposal certainly does not contemplate a media
environment bereft of large entities. Institutional media have undeniable
value for democracy because of their distinct perspective and their
newsgathering resources. In part, however, the argument that media
concentration serves democracy reflects uncritical adherence to the
traditional public-private distinction.402 As I have contended, government
requires checking not because it is “public” but because it is powerful.
Large, powerful corporations are not natural enemies of government.
They may share government’s interests in many aspects of the status quo,
398 See FCC v. National Citizens’ Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 798-802 (1978)
(upholding against First Amendment challenge FCC rules barring cross-ownership of
newspaper and broadcast station in same market).
399 A complementary path to facilitating democratic discourse, advocated most
vigorously by Yochai Benkler, lies in encouraging the development of decentralized forms of
mass communication on the model of the Internet. See Yochai Benkler, A Speakers’ Corner
Under the Sun, in ELKIN-KOREN & NETANEL, supra note 93, at 291, 305-14 (positing
superiority of an informational commons model in terms of democratic discourse and
personal autonomy); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 561, 568 (2000) (arguing for a regulatory structure designed to ensure “[a]n open, free,
flat, peer-to-peer network”).
400 See Baker, supra note 384, at 426-31 (using economic analysis to refute argument
that market produces what media consumers value or need). Even the Internet has
produced only limited diversity in the information most people receive. See Matthew
Hindman & Cukier, supra note 391, at A17 (summarizing findings that very small number
of Web sites receive vast majority of traffic because of “winner take all” effect of search
engines and hyperlinks).
401 Blasi, supra note 93, at 541; see also Neil W. Netanel, Taking Stock: The Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1885 (2000) (arguing that
“some degree of hierarchy, some concentration of expressive power in media enterprises, is
the price we must pay if the press is to be able to fulfill its vital watchdog and agendasetting roles”) (hereinafter Netanel, Taking Stock).
402 Blasi vigorously defends the public-private distinction. See Blasi, supra note 93, at
538-41. In contrast, Netanel joins his nuanced defense of institutional media to an
acknowledgement that they “serve as an important check on both government and private
entity malfeasance.” Netanel, Taking Stock, supra note 399, at 1923.
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and the two sorts of institutions may coopt one another in many
circumstances. In addition, arguments for concentrated media power may
reflect the fallacy, debunked by ontological critics of the public-private
distinction,403 that a climate dominated by large corporations reflects
absence of government control.404 Without doubt a healthy democracy
requires a media environment with both large and small components,405
but that need reflects the importance of diversity and competition more
than the importance of concentrated “private” power. In any event,
judicial review of congressional policy on media ownership could curb
decentralization that undermined political debate as surely as it could
curb centralization.
The ongoing controversy over recent FCC regulations that would ease
restrictions on ownership of multiple media outlets exemplifies the
opportunity for indirect First Amendment oversight of the news media.
In June 2003 the FCC voted 3-2 to ease restrictions on cross-ownership
within a single media market of newspapers and broadcast stations; to
allow a single company to own up to three television stations in the
largest media markets; and to allow a single television network to own
stations that effectively reach up to 90 percent of the national audience.406
Advocates and opponents alike agreed that the new rules would spur
further concentration of media ownership.407 An ideologically diverse
coalition of political, religious, and consumer organizations opposed the
FCC’s action, charging that the new rules would produce a greater
uniformity of viewpoints on the airwaves.408
Even some media
executives decried the FCC’s deregulatory fervor as damaging to media
403

See supra section II.B.1. and accompanying text.
See Blasi, supra note 93, at 542 (warning, in course of argument supportive of large
institutional media, of dangers “if modern government were ever to gain complete control of
the channels of mass communication”); Netanel, Taking Stock, supra note 399, at 1885
(asserting that “liberal democracy requires media enterprises that are independent from
state support”).
405 See Netanel, Taking Stock, supra note 399, at 1886 (advocating media policy that
balances need for diverse perspectives with need for powerful institutional media). Netanel
ultimately advocates a government media policy that includes “cross-ownership and
consolidation restrictions, subsidizing non-commercial media outlets, and other measures
designed to support a multiplicity of expressive sources.” Id. at 1925.
406 See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Votes to Relax Rules Limiting Media Ownership, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2003, p. A1, C9. The regulations expressly allow a network to own stations
that reach 45% of the national audience – up from the previous rule’s 35% – but the
commission retained a formula that excludes UHF viewers from the calculation, making the
actual limit much higher.
407 See David D. Kirkpatrick, New Rules Give Big Media Chance to Get Even Bigger,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, p. C1 (hereinafter Kirkpatrick, New Rules).
408 See id. at C9 (identifying coalition of opponents as including National Rifle
Association, National Organization for Women, Common Cause, United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Writers Guild of America, and
Parents Television Council).
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diversity.409 Perhaps most significant, although little noted in the United
States, was the criticism by a leading international rights monitor. On the
eve of the FCC’s vote, Freimut Duve, representative for media freedom
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, warned that
the new regulations “may affect the pluralism of opinion that
characterizes the media scene in the U.S.”410 Calling the U.S. “the most
symbolically important country for the culture of press freedom,” Duve
expressed particular concern with the negative example the regulations’
constriction of opinion might set “for other OSCE-participating states
where democratic counterbalances to authoritarian rule, including free
media, are still weak.”411
A federal appellate court already has issued a preliminary injunction
against the new rules.412 The Senate has voted to repeal them, but the
House may not follow suit, and President Bush has promised to defend
the rules with his veto pen.413 Should Congress fail to block the
regulations, this article’s First Amendment analysis provides a solid First
Amendment ground on which a federal court could do so. Under the
public rights theory, a court could sustain a First Amendment challenge to
the FCC rules based on a showing that their promotion of media
concentration undermined the media’s facilitation of informed political
debate. Such an injunction would cure a governmental effort to
undermine First Amendment interests. Focusing on assertive oversight of
media regulations would allow courts to enforce First Amendment values
without undermining those same values by imposing substantive
judgments on particular editorial decisions. Judicial intervention against
concentration of media ownership would not have directly improved
major media outlets’ lackluster performance before, during, and after the
Iraq war. But consistent judicial pressure on Congress to promote a
diverse, independent media should encourage vigorous newsgathering
and reporting in good times and, more importantly, in bad.
C.Why the Court?
Aside from the substantive novelty of extending the First Amendment
to prevent nongovernmental institutions from censoring political debate,
such a doctrinal shift would require federal courts to make numerous
difficult judgments.
Courts would have to determine whether a
409 See Kirkpatrick, New Rules, supra note 405, at C9 (discussing opposition of Ted
Turner and Barry Diller to new FCC regulations).
410 Marcus Kabel, Rights Monitor Critical of U.S. Media Ownership, IRISH TIMES, May
30, 2003, p. 11.
411 Id.
412 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 18390 (3d Cir. Sept. 3,
2003).
413 See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Plan to Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2003, p. A1.
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challenged action seriously undermined political debate; if it did, whether
the First Amendment nonetheless gave the defendant some basis to claim
sanctuary from judicial oversight; and, if no such basis existed, what sort
of First Amendment test should control the case. In addition, courts
would have to determine when institutions’ instrumental contributions to
fostering political debate entitled them to advance First Amendment
claims against constraints on their own actions. Those inquiries would
require complex, multifaceted analyses, and our legal culture tends to
resist expansion of the judicial role on grounds of both institutional
competence and the separation of powers.414 Consideration of available
alternatives, however, leaves little room to doubt that when
nongovernmental institutions pose a serious threat to political debate,
only federal courts stand in a strong position to stop them.
One alternative to the sort of judicial review I propose would be to
give Congress primary responsibility for ensuring that nongovernmental
institutions respect First Amendment norms.
Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court’s recent protectiveness of its authority to interpret
constitutional provisions,415 Congress as well as courts can safeguard
constitutional values.416 Indeed, recognition of nongovernmental threats
to individual rights sometimes leads courts to ease constitutional
constraints on state action in order to allow legislatures to solve the
problem.417 Statutes have normative and practical advantages over the
judicial process because Congress is a politically accountable institution
with the mandate and resources to make difficult policy decisions.418
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress appropriately
may safeguard expressive interests the First Amendment does not ensure.

414 See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (advocating alternative
means of vindicating constitutional values where institutional concerns counsel against
judicial enforcement).
415 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act on ground that only Court had proper authority to define
constitutional constraints on states).
416 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 507 (noting that state and federal
statutes and state common law can protect against nongovernmental infringements on
rights); Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1580-1600 (discussing statutory efforts to hold
nongovernmental actors to First Amendment norms).
417 See Baker, supra note 384, at 422-23 (explaining that “the societal need to rein in
private power” may incline courts “toward restricting or sculpting constitutional protections
of private power in order to leave that power subject to legislative control”); Strauss,
Persuasion, supra note 329, at 368-70 (discussing circumstances under which easing of
constitutional constraints on government regulation of speech might be justified).
418 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962)
(advancing classic argument that majoritarian decisionmaking is preferable to lawmaking
by unelected judges).
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In CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,419 the Court upheld
an FCC order that broadcast television networks sell extensive time to the
Carter presidential campaign, pursuant to a federal statute that mandated
“reasonable access” to the airwaves for federal political candidates.420
Although the Court in an earlier case had held that the First Amendment
did not require broadcasters to sell advertising space for political
messages,421 the majority in CBS v. FCC concluded that Congress
properly had created an affirmative right of access to the airwaves for
political candidates.422 In some circumstances, as the public rights theory
of expressive freedom recognizes, Congress should and does protect
expressive freedom.
In the context of wartime dissent, however, reliance on congressional
action is dangerous, because Congress in wartime is likely to welcome
the efforts of nongovernmental censors. Nongovernmental suppression of
wartime dissent usually reflects genuine or calculated sympathy with
government policies; thus, even when the government itself is not the
censor, suppression of dissent tends to serve government interests.423
Expecting the government to restrict actions that both serve its own
interests and relieve it of the political costs of curbing speech is
unrealistic. Even if Congress enacted forceful statutory restrictions on
nongovernmental censorship during times of national calm, enforcement
of such restrictions during wartime would depend on the politically
motivated decisions of Executive Branch officials. If some institution
within government must guard against rights violations that advance
government policies, the principle of representation-reinforcing judicial
review424 indicates that the judiciary is the best candidate.
Another possible method of protecting expression against private
censorship would be for courts to create a common law tort, or a set of
torts, for censorship of speech.425 This would create a similar structure to
the law’s protection of privacy interests, which has separate constitutional
and common law tort schemes.426 A tort approach to protection of
419

453 U.S. 367 (1981).
See 42 U.S.C. sec. 312 (a) (7).
421 See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). For a discussion
of CBS v. DNC, see supra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
422 See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 379 (holding that Congress had “created a right of
access that enlarged the political broadcasting responsibilities of licensees”).
423 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
424 See United States v. Carolene Products Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (defining
limited circumstances in which Court properly may submit legislation to more searching
review in order to ensure proper political representation); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980) (elaborating representation reinforcement theory).
425 For a proposal along these lines, see Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech From Private
Abridgement: Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 S.W.U. L. REV. 223 (1996).
426 See generally RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 22-24 (2d ed. 2002) (describing origins of privacy rights in common law and
constitutional contexts).
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expressive freedom, however, would contravene the public rights theory
of expressive freedom by making speech protection against private parties
a matter of individual initiative and interest rather than the common good.
Legal protection of dissent would depend on the willingness of the
aggrieved speaker to litigate and establish both liability and damages.
Under the constitutional approach I propose, the entire political
community shares the legal interest in unfettered receipt of ideas.427 In
addition, reliance on state tort law to protect political debate would
inappropriately consign a central national interest to fifty different locally
determined and potentially inconsistent tort regimes.
A more promising alternative method of safeguarding political debate
against nongovernmental censorship would be reliance on state
constitutional or statutory law. In PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins,428 the Supreme Court upheld against First and Fifth Amendment
challenges a California constitutional requirement that shopping center
owners must permit expressive activities on their premises. The Court
rejected the argument that its denial in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner429 of a
federal constitutional mandate of expressive access to shopping centers
implied a federal constitutional bar on state mandates.430 Instead, the
Court assessed the state rule de novo and deferred substantially to the
state’s regulatory prerogatives in rejecting the federal constitutional
challenges.431 State provisions of the sort upheld in PruneYard perform a
valuable service in the absence of federal constitutional protection, but
they fall far short of extending the First Amendment in the manner I have
suggested. First, the necessity for national protection of a nationally
significant value should discourage reliance on state constitutions or
statutes as much as on state common law. Second, attempted state
statutory solutions leave reviewing courts free to reimpose the publicprivate distinction, at least in cases that arguably involve clashing
expressive interests, by reference to the supposed state action requirement

427 In this respect, as in many others, adoption of the public rights theory to adjudicate
First Amendment disputes would require the Court to liberalize its cramped standing
doctrine, starting with the denial of standing for so-called “generalized grievances.” See,
e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying
standing to challenge reserve membership of Members of Congress on ground that asserted
grievance was held in common by the general public). Alternatively, the Court could
preserve present standing requirements by treating aggrieved speakers as trustees for the
public interest in access to information. But even that approach to standing would differ
from a tort regime, which would divert judicial attention from societal to personal injuries.
428 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
429 407 U.S. 551 (1972); see supra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
430 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 80-81.
431 See id. at 83-85 (rejecting Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and substantive due
process challenges), 85-88 (rejecting First Amendment compelled speech challenge).
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of the First Amendment.432 Finally, California-style protections against
nongovernmental censorship are rare and limited in scope,433 suggesting a
level of political resistance that advocates of expressive freedom would
struggle to overcome one state at a time.
The conclusion that the federal judiciary is best positioned to restrict
nongovernmental censorship of wartime dissent would require the
Supreme Court to identify a legal basis for injunctions against
nongovernmental suppression of political debate. United States Code
Chapter 42, section 1983, which authorizes suits to enjoin violations of
constitutional rights, applies only to state actors.434 The Court could clear
this hurdle in a manner parallel to its approach in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Agents.435 In Bivens, the Court confronted the problem that no
federal statute gave courts explicit authority to award damages against
federal officials for constitutional violations. The majority created a
cause of action. It concluded that, although “the Fourth Amendment does
not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money
damages,”436 such a remedy was appropriate because “[h]istorically,
damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal interests in liberty.”437 Just as the Court in Bivens decreed that a
defendant’s federal character should not bar a remedy typically available
for the sort of violation at issue, it could decree that the nongovernmental
character of a defendant should not bar the availability of all relief for
First Amendment violations.
Professors Alexander and Sunstein, both ontological critics of the
public-private distinction, raise substantive objections to allowing
constitutional injunctions against nongovernmental actors.438 Alexander
maintains that because “all exercises of private power take place against a
background of laws that are paradigmatic state action . . . any
432 See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1988)
(rejecting free speech claim under Massachusetts statute because both parties in dispute
presented expressive interests and “the . . . “right” to free speech . . . traditionally has
content only in relation to state action”). The First Circuit in Redgrave avoided directly
subordinating the Massachusetts statute to the First Amendment by characterizing the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s responses to certified questions as having relied on
the interpretive canon of constitutional doubt to establish a statutory defense based on
competing expressive interests. See id. at 910-11.
433 In fact, the California Supreme Court recently held that the state’s Constitution
protects expressive freedom only against state action, reading PruneYard to depend on the
“functional equivalence” of shopping centers with traditional public forums. See Golden
Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001) (rejecting state
constitutional challenge to apartment building’s bar on leafleting).
434 See 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
435 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
436 Id. at 396.
437 Id. at 395.
438 Textual objections to the idea of injunctions against nongovernmental actions
replicate the defects of the supposed textual basis for the public-private distinction. See
supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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constitutional challenge to the exercise of private power can and should
be recharacterized as a constitutional challenge to those background
laws.”439 Per Sunstein, “there should be enthusiastic agreement – for
reasons of both text and principle – that . . . private conduct raises no
constitutional question.”440 Their arguments appears to reflect a concern
that allowing constitutionally based injunctions against private actors
would destroy the boundary, essential to liberal democracy, between
entities who possess rights and entities bound to honor rights.441
Reconceptualizing the constitutional public-private distinction as a
personal integrity principle obviates that concern, however,442 and the
public rights theory of expressive freedom provides a basis for
distinguishing between entities the First Amendment protects and those it
obligates.443 Insistence on a government defendant reflects the logic of
the state action doctrine, under which the only basis for holding shopping
mall owners constitutionally obligated to accommodate protestors is the
formal claim that the owners’ property rights depend on privileges the
government has accorded. In contrast, the approach I have outlined
allows a court to subject the mall’s owners to the First Amendment
because their actions significantly undermine political discourse. It
avoids the contrivance of requiring people whose rights nongovernmental
institutions abridge to cast about for some governmental action – perhaps
a broad-based policy that only facilitates denials of rights in rare
circumstances – to challenge. Under present doctrine, even if mall
protestors convinced a court that their exclusion by the mall’s owners was
“state action,” they would need to vindicate their rights indirectly,
perhaps by suing the local zoning board.444 That suit, however, would be
impractical and misdirected, probably to the point of failing the Court’s
present Article III standing tests for causation and redressability.445 We
should not trap expressive freedom between a rock and a hard place.
439
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441 See Alexander, supra note 278, at 368 (characterizing “the too hasty jump from bad
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442 See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
443 See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
444 The likelihood that nongovernmental institutions may censor dissent because of
actual or tacit governmental influence creates a basis under existing doctrine for treating
such self-censorship as state action, which would obviate the novel justification for judicial
intervention presented here. See TRIBE, supra note 279, at 1715 (“[T]he more government
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445 Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984) (denying standing to challengers of
federal tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools because challengers’
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traceable to challenged tax exemptions).
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CONCLUSION
The American ideal that sovereignty resides in the people means that
the people must have access to ideas and opinions about matters of
communal concern in order to ensure that our elected representatives
make wise policy decisions. Popular engagement in policymaking serves
an especially weighty purpose in times of war and national emergency.
Unfortunately, the potency of wartime governments tends to discourage
political debate at exactly the moments when it is most valuable to
society. Courts have long applied the First Amendment to try to protect
political debate from direct governmental interference, even in wartime.
In contrast, nongovernmental suppression of wartime political debate has
flourished. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, merchants who use their real
and intangible property to do business with the public have excluded
political speakers; employers and other powerful institutions have
imposed punishments against people who have opposed government
policies; and the news media have suppressed information necessary for
an informed political debate about matters of war and peace. That these
assaults on essential public discourse have come from “private” rather
than government sources should give us no comfort, because any assault
on public discourse undermines democracy.
Our present constitutional understanding immunizes nongovernmental
institutions from constitutional responsibilities by bestowing on them the
title of “private actors.” If we accept democratic self-determination as a
core value of the Constitution, that understanding must change. When we
peel away the public-private distinction’s elaborate layers of formalism,
we find a small but important kernel of truth: the Constitution should not
interfere with the personal integrity of individuals. That principle has
great importance in the First Amendment context, because it facilitates
people’s engagement in the process of collective self-determination. But
the principle’s limits reveal many fallacies in present First Amendment
doctrine. Courts should not allow property owners to exclude political
speakers from otherwise expansive invitations for the public to use
shopping malls or buy advertising time simply because the property
owners are not the government. Courts should not allow employers to
fire employees for speaking out politically simply because the employers
are not the government. Although the needs of public discourse compel
courts to avoid interfering with the news media’s editorial decisions, they
should not allow media corporations to consolidate control over people’s
access to information. Because all of these actions degrade political
debate, they all offend the First Amendment.
This article implicates numerous questions that require further
examination. The task of defining the political expression to which I urge
courts to extend special constitutional protection remains challenging, as
does the task of determining the boundaries, if any, outside which my
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proposal should not operate. I have made no effort to address every
practical question courts would need to confront when invoking the First
Amendment against nongovernmental actors. Most broadly of all, my
proposed reconceptualization of the public-private distinction in
constitutional law would alter the outcomes of numerous disputes
involving other constitutional rights. In the necessarily narrow sphere
where I have situated my argument, however, altering the operation of the
public-private distinction would make sense and bring important benefits.
Absent some specific reason to limit the First Amendment’s reach in a
particular circumstance, the Court should enjoin nongovernmental
interference with wartime political debate.

